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THE HERMENEUTICS OF SEXUAL ORDER
Ali Khan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, the mystique of sex has occupied a
conspicuous place in human consciousness: almost all disci-
plines, including religion, psychology, and law, have exam-
ined multi-faceted manifestations of the sexual instinct, offer-
ing numerous and often opposing interpretations of the mag-
ic and the myth of sexual love, revealing both its moral dan-
ger and its inherent beauty.1 Theologians, moral philoso-
phers, and legislators create complex codes to define, regu-
late and suppress forms of sexual love thought to be immor-
al. Artists, psychoanalysts, and libertarians, on the other
hand, often emphasize the need for sexual liberty,
deconstructing apparent and hidden social barriers that law
and morality have erected between (and among) free men
and free women who want to experience the joy of uninhibit-
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1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisput-
ably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ag-
es; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public con-
cern.
Id. at 479.
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ed sex.' Each culture and each generation attempt to strike
a balance between these controversial interpretations of sexu-
al love. The splendor of sexual controversies, however, lies in
their perpetuity.
The history of Western sexual order reveals a grand
cluster of contradictions, containing both vice and virtue,
guilt and innocence, order and freedom, law and liberty.
Rape, celibacy, fornication, and adultery all are interpreta-
tions of the sexual instinct: the pieces of a complex puzzle,
the faces of a paradox, the constructs of human sexuality.
These and other manifestations of sexual love are autobio-
graphical notes in the history of the human species.' They
reveal the dilemmas of instinctual animation, the duality in
human nature, the contradictions of sexual civilization. Each
expression of sexual love argues for some moral principle,
some cultural paradigm, some psychological propulsion. For
example, rape can be understood to represent the brutish
nature of man, the triumph of violence, the need for law;4
celibacy to represent the glorification of virtue, the fear of
sexuality, the need for liberty.' Similarly, marriage dwells
upon an historically ingrained precept that genital sex is
legitimate within a socially contracted relationship. Through
the ritual of marriage, genital sex acquires a new meaning: it
becomes marital sex, a new reality, a new symbol, which
represents a bond, a commitment, a family.
Not all interpretations of sexual love are universally ac-
cepted, however; cultures distinguish themselves with differ-
ing hermeneutics of sexual order.' Some allow polygamy but
2. D. PCHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 86-87 (1977).
3. Sexual love in its. popular and barest meaning may be described as the
union of the genitals, copulation or sexual intercourse: it is made when the male
sex organ penetrates the female sex organ. For the purpose of clarity, sexual love
may be distinguished from genital sex. Genital sex is essentially the union of the
genitals, and it may exclude other forms of sexual contact. A broad definition of
sexual love on the other hand would include any sexual contact between two
persons. Sexual love therefore is a more expansive concept that includes but is
not limited to genital sex. Anal and oral sex, for example, fall within the defini-
tion of sexual love. A vivid contrast may be noted between genital sex and sexual
love: Genital sex is potentially procreative, but sexual love may or may not be;
stated differently, genital sex is always heterosexual, but sexual love may be het-
erosexual, it may be homosexual, it may even be bisexual.
4. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 81-92 (1987).
5. E. PAGELS, ADAM, EVE, AND THE SERPENT 78-97 (1988).
6. The term "hermeneutics" has a particularized meaning for the purposes
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prohibit fornication; some allow fornication but prohibit
polygamy; some prohibit sexual love between men and wom-
en of different religions, some between different castes, some
between different races.7 Each culture develops a unique
ideology of sexual love. But even within the same culture,
the manifestations of sexual love do not remain static: they
are constantly debated, attacked, modified, discarded, but
also defended and retained. Each generation, if not each
individual, interprets sexual love in a different way, following
its own imagination, asserting its own libido, interjecting its
own superego. Traditional interpretations, however, linger on
in new costumes, behind new masks, in a different vocabu-
lary. Thus old and new manifestations of sexual love join to
create new combinations and conflicts, and the sexual order
appears to be in constant flux, always flowing, meandering,
changing course.
New moral and philosophical twists are being constantly
added to further compound the nature of sexual order. For
example, the feminist movement rejects the traditional views
of sexual morality and notions about female sexuality. Some
women demonstrate how men have constructed intricate
moral and legal sex codes to subjugate women and to en-
trench male superiority.8 Others argue that new sexual liber-
ties are male subterfuges that deprive women of their human
dignity, that new images of "freedom" turn them into objects
of visual gratification, showing them stripped and bound in
the name of choice and ecstasy.' Still others debunk the sig-
nificance as well as the necessity of genital sex and espouse
female friendship, militant lesbianism. 0 Similarly, male ho-
of this article, detailed below (see infra note 11). However, the term may be gener-
ally defined as "the science of interpretation, or of finding the meaning of an
authors words and phrases, and explaining it to others; exegesis ... W." EBSTER'S
NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 851 (2d. ed. 1983).
7. Islam, for example, forbids Muslims to marry nonbelievers except Jews
and Christians. Under Hinduism, inter-caste marriages were proscribed. In the
United States, interracial marriages were largely prohibited until the Supreme
Court declared marriage as a fundamental right. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
8. S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 79 (1949) (H. Parshley trans. 1952).
9. Dworkin, Pornography Is A Civil Rights Issue For Women, 21 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 55-56 (1987-88); MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 66-67 (1985). But for a contrary perspective, see Dunlap, Sexual
Speech and the State; Putting Pornography in its Place, 17 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV.
359 (1987).
10. R. SIMPSON, FROM THE CLOSETS TO THE COURTS 43-55 (1977). For a cri-
1990]
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mosexuals object to the traditional morality that considers
genital sex the only acceptable form of sexual love, and ex-
cludes anal and oral sex from social respectability. Both male
and female homosexuals reject the exclusive social status to
which genital sex has been elevated in human sexuality.
The hermeneutics of sexual order provide a moral orga-
nization to control and guide the raw energy of the human
sexual instinct." Traditional prohibitions against unlawful
sex such as fornication, adultery, and homosexuality, and
conventional institutions such as marriage and family are
aspects of a moral framework designed to bring order and
stability to human sexuality. Although modern constructs of
sexual order are based on secular ethics, traditional struc-
tures to regulate human sexuality are often founded upon
religion. The hermeneutics of sexual order in the Western
Christian Tradition, for example, has derived its initial va-
lidity and authority from interpretations of sacred texts.' 2 A
profound bond between religion and the sexual order creates
fusion between faith and the sexual instinct. This fusion then
becomes a powerful source of religious consciousness that
functions as a subjective control mechanism to suppress the
sexual instinct and to guide it to permissible forms of sexual
love.
While the norms of a sexual order are rooted in com-
plex workings of social forces, they are often defended in the
name of an eminent, if not a sacred, text. When sexual
norms are lodged within the body of a prominent text such
as the Bible or the United States Constitution, they acquire
legitimacy as well as respectability. The interpretative pro-
tique of this idea, see DE BEAUVIOR, supra note 6, 404-424.
11. The hermeneutics of sexual order is rooted in the interpretations of two
great texts: the Bible and the Constitution. The content and methods of herme-
neutics, confined to theological-exegetical understanding in earlier times, have un-
dergone several revisions. Yet hermeneutics remains in essence the art of textual
interpretation in a human context. This article is influenced by a conception of
hermeneutics that blends methodological skills of interpretation with experiential
self-awareness. According to this concept, the understanding of the written word
becomes inseparable from existential reality as well as transcendental reflection. See
H. GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE, (F. Lawrence, trans. 1981); TRUTH
AND METHOD: OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, (C. Barden & J.
Cumming ed. 1975); J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTEREST, (J. Shapiro,
trans. 1978); W. JEANROND, TEXT AND INTERPRETATION, (T. Wilson, trans. 1988).
12. See genera/!y J. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDI-
EVAL EUROPE (1987).
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cesses by which sexual norms are placed within the meaning
of a principal text may be called the hermeneutics of sexual
order. This article explores the sexual order constructed in
the name of the Bible and compares it with contemporary
sexual norms seeking legitimacy in the name of the Constitu-
tion, finding several direct and inverted relationships between
interpretations of these two foundational texts. This compari-
son, however, poses difficult methodological problems. While
it is safe to assume that the United States Supreme Court is
the final interpreter of the Constitution, there is no such
consensus regarding the final interpreter of the Bible. Seri-
ous interpretive differences exist among ancient as well as
contemporary theological schools of thought. A sincere at-
tempt to classify these interpretive schools in broad catego-
ries such as Catholic and Protestant may have some legitima-
cy, but such an attempt must inevitably fail given the diver-
gence of interpretations even within Catholicism and Protes-
tantism. In the presence of such hermeneutic diversity, any
choice of an authentic interpretive authority is open to criti-
cism and opposition.
This article explores the hermeneutics of sexual order
that St. Augustine developed in the fourth century.'3 It is
not contended that St. Augustine's interpretation of the Bible
represents the authoritative version of Christianity. Nor is it
asserted that St. Augustine is or must be considered the
chief arbiter of biblical jurisprudence. Nonetheless, few would
deny he is one of the greatest interpreters of the holy text.
In addition, his views on human sexuality have profound
psychological insights. Therefore, an examination of the Au-
gustinian sexual order is helpful in understanding religious
neurosis, 4 which suppresses the sexual instinct both at the
individual and collective level and provides a stable mecha-
nism by which an institutional moral structure is transmitted
to posterity. Furthermore, this article demonstrates some of
the connections between the constitutional jurisprudence of
sexual order and Augustinian consciousness. It is not con-
13. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. With a fascinating back-
ground in grammar, literature, music, rhetoric, and philosophy, St. Augustine
rejected his father's wish to become a lawyer. At the age-of 32, he converted to
Christianity.
14. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
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tended that constitutional jurisprudence is explicitly based
upon Augustine's theology; Augustinian consciousness must
be distinguished from Augustine's consciousness. Augustinian
consciousness is used in this article as a generic term that
includes a broad-based consciousness cutting across sects and
denominations, particularly in the realm of sexual morality.
Augustine's consciousness, on the other hand, is more spe-
cific knowledge or awareness rooted particularly in
Augustine's works and his conception of Christianity. 5
Some major aspects of constitutional jurisprudence are
discussed to show their conformity with the Augustinian
sexual order. It is then shown how the constitutional juris-
prudence in the past few decades has begun to drift away
from religious neurosis. Nonetheless, the article maintains
that even contemporary sexual culture of individual rights
and freedoms has failed to sever the umbilical cord that has
linked the Constitution to the Augustinian sexual order. In
other words, the religious neurosis that has shaped consti-
tutional jurisprudence in the past has not been fully over-
come. It still is a major force, which continues to assert itself
behind a changed and even inverted legal vocabulary.
To discuss the hermeneutics of sexual order, several key
terms are employed: religious neurosis, the sexual partner, the
sexual practice, and the sexual objective. While in ordinary lan-
guage these terms may vary in meaning, here they are used
with some precision. Therefore, a few clarifications might be
helpful.
Religious neurosis in the broad sense is essentially a
form of compulsive consciousness rooted in a specific reli-
gion and transmitted from one generation to another. The
term religious neurosis in popular meaning has negative
implications, since many people associate neuroses with ab-
normal behavior and even mental illness. Here, however, the
term is not used in a pejorative sense. Although extreme
forms of religious neurosis may have some pathological as-
pects, there is no need to assume that religious neurosis is a
mental disease. Religious neurosis should not be confused
with Freud's concept of psychoneurosis. Psycho-neurosis is
15. The claim that constitutional jurisprudence is directly derived from St.
Augustine's theology is a claim of historical causation. No such causational con-
nection is suggested or presumed in this paper.
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caused when internal sexual suppression and external limita-
tion of freedom or inaccessibility of a normal sexual partner
bring about perversions in persons.' 6 Several distinctions
between psychoneurosis and religious neurosis may be noted.
First, psychoneurosis is limited to sexuality, which religious
neurosis is not; religious neurosis is a broader mental con-
struct that regulates many spheres of life. Second, psychoneu-
rosis is intra-subjective and individualistic, religious neurosis
is inter-subjective and communal. Third, psychoneurosis may
lead to perversions; religious neurosis may provide the moral
framework and the requisite communal consciousness that
allow individuals to express their sexuality in an orderly and
socially acceptable manner. 7
Ordinarily, religious neurosis manifests itself through the
shared values and laws (as well as the biases and prejudices)
of the community. The older the religion, the more en-
trenched is its neurosis. In fact, their historical dimension im-
parts additional validity to the values sanctioned by and ema-
nating from religious neurosis. Ordinarily, religious neurosis
is so overpowering that each generation experiences an inner
compulsion and perhaps a subconscious drive to transmit its
values to the next generation. This inter-generational neurosis
is transmitted in varied and complex ways including the for-
mation of cultural. habits, taboos, mores, and institutionalized
education."s During transmission, neurosis may undergo a
few distortions or modifications causing some changes in the
neurotic formation of the succeeding generation. But there is
no need to assume that such distortions or modifications
would necessarily diminish the main thrust of religious neu-
rosis or its core values. Sixteenth-century reformers, for ex-
ample, challenged the patristic belief that any sex for plea-
sure was sinful. Their protest, however, constituted only a
16. S. FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY 62-63 U. Strachey
trans. 1962).
17. See id. at 36-37. Despite these distinctions between the two, it is not
suggested that religious neurosis may never cause psychoneuroses. Hafen, The Con-
stitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy - Balancing the Individual
and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 478 (1983).
18. At Washburn University, this paper was presented for comments and crit-
icism in the Law and Religion seminar. There were two participants who did not
hesitate to show their disgust, openly in the seminar. In fact, the paper was so
offensive to their sense of religion that they read only the first few pages and
stopped. These participants also objected to the concept of religious neurosis.
1990]
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marginal modification to accepted tenets, by proposing that
married couples should be morally permitted to have sex for
pleasure. Consistent with the central assertion of religious
neurosis, their condemnation of sex for pleasure outside mar-
riage remained blunt and severe.19
The sexual partner is the person with whom the sexual
act takes place."0 The term does not require that the sexual
partner must always be a person of the opposite sex. It in-
cludes persons of the opposite sex as well as of the same
sex. Because sex with animals is universally condemned, con-
sideration of the implications of bestiality would require an
intricate moral discourse, beyond the scope of this article.
Therefore, the term means a person, even though it is broad
enough to include animals. Similarly, the term sexual partner
implies a living person; there is little dispute that sex with
dead bodies is morally repugnant and, therefore, properly
forbidden. Thus, the term sexual partner used in this article
means a living person of either sex.
A sexual practice' is a voluntary sexual act between
adult sexual partners in a noncommercial, private setting.
Sexual acts involving elements of force, commercialization,
and public exposure pose an important but different set of
moral questions and, therefore, they are excluded from the
definition. The term sexual practice is further restricted in
meaning: it excludes sexual acts such as masturbation and
19. Although the sixteenth-century reformers proposed some changes in old
sexual beliefs, they did not challenge the central thesis that sex is legitimate only
within the marriage. Luther and Calvin, for example, denounced the old belief
that marital sex for pleasure was sinful. Nonetheless, their condemnation of
non-marital sex was unequivocal. Some of Calvin's Puritan followers believed that
sex outside of marriage resulted from flawed minds and crooked souls. Almost all
reformers advocated stiff penalties for illicit sex. Luther and Bucer proposed that
adultery ought to be punished by death. Samuel Saxey, an extreme puritan,
suggested that the couple who' had been consumed by the fires of illicit passion
deserved to be burnt alive. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 557.
20. S. FREUD, supra note 16, at 2. Freud uses the term "sexual object" to
mean a person from whom sexual attraction proceeds. Since the Freudian term
dehumanizes the person, it is not used here. Moreover, sexual partner has become
a standard term in judicial analysis.
21. S. FREUD, supra note 16, at 2. Freud uses the term "sexual aim" to define
the act towards which the sexual instinct tends. Again the Freudian term is not
used in this article, partly because the term "sexual practice" is now frequently
used in legal analysis, and partly to avoid any confusion that might arise between
"sexual aim" and "sexual objective." See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 415 N.E. 2d 936,
994 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (employing the term "sexual practices").
[Vol. 31
HERMENEUTICS OF SEXUAL ORDER
other acts of autoeroticism that an individual may perform
without a sexual partner. Likewise, the term is not used to
discuss the variety of positions and postures that individuals
may use to enhance the quality of their sexual pleasure or
the degree of their sexual adventure. The term focuses upon
only principal sexual practices involving genital organs. One
principal sexual practice is the union of the genitals, genital
sex, commonly known as sexual intercourse or copulation.
Other principal sexual practices involve at least one genital
organ. Oral sex, for example, is a sexual practice involving
the genital organ of one sexual partner and the mouth of
another; anal sex is a sexual practice involving the male gen-
ital organ and the anus of the other partner. These sexual
practices are often grouped together and called acts of sod-
omy.
The sexual objective focuses upon the purpose for which
sexual partners engage in a sexual practice. There are two
main sexual objectives: sex for procreation and sex for plea-
sure. Sexual practices for the purpose of procreation are
limited. In fact, there is only one sexual practice available for
procreation: the union of the genitals. Because anal and oral
sex cannot result in procreation, the sexual objective of such
practices is of course pleasure. There is no need to assume
that procreation and pleasure are always mutually exclusive
sexual objectives. For example, heterosexual partners may
copulate, simultaneously for procreation and pleasure. When
heterosexual partners engage in copulation using contracep-
tives, however, their sexual objective is pleasure and not
procreation. Given the availability and increased reliability of
contraceptives, all sexual practices including genital sex may
now be exercised for pure pleasure.
II. THE TRADITIONAL SEXUAL ORDER
The hermeneutics of sexual order in the Western Chris-
tian tradition is founded upon a duality that sex is both
good and bad: it is good because it procreates; it is bad
because it corrupts human spirituality.2 2 According to the
first Fathers of the Church, pleasures of the flesh are inher-
22. J. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 6
(1987).
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ently ungodly.28 .In fact, the flesh is sin, destined to damn
the soul. 4 Nonetheless, reproductive necessity mandates
that the sin be committed. This is how the story of sexual
morality begins, taking an erratic start, falling into a duality,
tormenting through a self-inflicted paradox from which the
hermeneutics of sexual order has yet to recover. Over the
centuries, theologians, philosophers, and legislators have cre-
ated intricate moral and legal codes to justify, explain, and
enforce the rules against unacceptable forms of sexual love,
which in their view polluted the soul, the faith, and the com-
munity, leading the faithful away from God and Church. The
order of duality, which drove a wedge between body and
soul, instinct and spirit, pleasure and virtue, liberty and law,
was developed in the name of the Gospels which had little to
say about sex, and in the name of Jesus who seemed relative-
ly uninterested in the subject. 5 But the Fathers of the
Church were determined to give a dualistic interpretation to
biblical verses and events.2 Thus the Church incorporated
dual sexual morality and became an authoritative source of
its approval as well as its dissemination. 7
Although sexual duality was cultivated in the patristic
age, by the Church Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries,
its seeds had already been sown in the Greek thought." Pla-
to, for example, treated love and sexuality with a profound
ambiguity, setting in motion the contradiction between plea-
sure and purity: the dialectic of duality. 9 In the Symposium,
Plato described sex as a positive force, a natural manifesta-
tion of love, an essential union between body and soul."0
But in the Republic and in the Laws, Plato seemed to have
changed his mind."1 In these works he argued that sexual
love was a distraction from the search for beauty, truth, and
23. Id. at 83-84.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 74.
26. Id. at 80-87.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 12-21.
29. Id. at 16.
30. PLATO, SYMPOSIUM, trans. in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO, VOL. 1 (B. Jowett
trans. 1892).
31. PLATO, REPUBLIC, book 5, at 458 trans. in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO,
VOL. 3 (B. Jowett trans. 1892); LAWS, book 1, book 8, trans. in THE DIALOGUES
OF PLATO, VOL. 5 (B. Jowett trans. 1892 at 13, 218-23).
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wisdom, and that any sexual love in which gratification of
the body was the primary goal ought to be avoided.32 Simi-
larly, Aristotle presented sexual love as antithetical to reason
and wisdom; in his view, it hindered higher pursuits and its
pleasure was unworthy."3 Nonetheless, if the species were to
be saved from a philosophical suicide, some recognition of at
least genital sex was unavoidable. Therefore, Plato proposed
that sex be restricted to procreation in marriage. He further
argued that marriage be made sacred in the highest de-
gree, 4 and not merely a social cloak to engage in sexual
intemperance-a disease of the soul. 5 Licentiousness, he de-
clared, is an unholy freedom that ought not to be permit-
ted.36
Intellectuals of the patristic age were pleased to discover
Christianity in Greek philosophy. 7 Among the patristic in-
tellectuals, St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430), is certainly the
most eloquent and the most influential.3 ' He belonged to
the first generation of Christian scholars who began to treat
sexual morality as a central issue in the Christian life, and
provided a rational basis to support Christian sexual beliefs,
which ascetics and monks had developed in the past three
centuries.3 9 Augustine's views about sexual order, however,
32. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 16.
33. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 429-449, (H. Racham, trans. 1926).
34. PLATO, REPUBLIC, book 5, trans. in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO VOL. 3 at
720 (Random House 1937).
35. PLATO, TIMAEUS, trans. in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO VOL. 5 (Random
House 1937).
36. PLATO, REPUBLIC, book 5, trans. in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO VOL. 3 at
720 (Random House 1937).
37. The Ancient moral teachers recognized a symbiotic relationship between
sexual morality and the preservation of marriage. They rejected all forms of
non-marital sex in unequivocal terms. St. Paul, for example, considered illicit sex
as serious as murder and condemned any and all sexual relationships outside of
marriage. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 60. St Augustine considered sex a grave
moral danger and believed that unchecked sexual passion could cause moral pol-
lution in the community. Since sex is an intrinsic evil, he maintained, married
people ought to have sex only to beget children. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at
81. But even married people, St. Jerome argued, should avoid sexual contact
whenever possible. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 82.
38. Hundreds of articles and books have been published in the past thirty
years to underscore the contributions of St. Augustine. Three biographies are par-
ticularly popular and recommended for a historical understanding of St. Augus-
tine: G. BONNER, ST. AUGUSTINE: LIFE AND CONTROVERSIES (1963); P. BROWN,
AUGUSTINE OF HiPPO (1967); E. TESELLE, AUGUSTINE THE THEOLOGIAN (1970).
39. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 79.
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were not confined to the patristic age: his morality has fun-
damentally influenced ideas about sexuality in the West.40 It
shaped the sexual order of the Middle Ages and beyond; in
fact, only a few decades ago legislation in the United States
dealing with sexual love was to a large extent consistent with
his views.4 Even today, many religious and non-religious
people promote and even practice the sexual life-style that
Augustine proposed sixteen hundred years ago. No longer,
however, is Augustine the undisputed authority in the Chris-
tian world. To some his sexual order is restrictive, outdated,
foolish, and sexist.4" Although he misunderstood the role of
sex in human life, his elucidation of the sexual order cap-
tured the imagination of millions of people over a period of
sixteen centuries, and it still does. Augustine's formidable
intellect baptized the order of duality and made it Chris-
tian.43
Following, perhaps, Plato's concept of sexual love,44
Augustine builds his morality based on the proposition that
sexual love plays a dual role in human life: it procreates and
it corrupts. The corrupting influence of sex, however, be-
comes his central concern as he considers the equation be-
tween sex and spirituality. He interprets the birth of Christ
to argue that everyone who is born of sexual intercourse is
in fact sinful flesh.45 He further insists that procreation
40. The patristic period spans over the fourth and fifth centuries. The
Church Fathers of this period imparted a systematic and rigorous theological justi-
fication to Christian beliefs. St. Gregory of Nyssa U. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at
335-395), St. Jerome U. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 347- 420) and St. Augustine
of Hippo U. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 354430) are the most influential among
patristic thinkers. Their teachings constituted the original sources of Christian
morality, which inspired many subsequent generations of Christian thinkers. Early
in the fifth century, Christianity became the official religion of the Roman state.
41. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 608-17.
42. See generally, K. BORRESEN, SUBORDINATION AND EQUIVALENCE: THE NA-
TURE AND ROLE OF WOMEN IN AUGUSTINE AND THOMAS AQUINAS (C. Talbot trans.
1981).
43. Id. at 339.
44. 1 W. OASES, BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE, xx-xi (1948). In his
introduction, Oases shows that among pagan sources that Augustine used to
develop his major theses, Plato is the most important. Augustine regarded Plato as
the greatest of the Greek and Roman thinkers.
45. ST. AUGUSTINE, ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE, book I, ch. 13 trans.
in TE NICENE AND POST NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH VOL. 5 at
269 (P. Holmes & R. Wallis trans. 1887) (P.Schaff ed. 1887). For a critique of
Augustine's thesis of the original sin, see E. PAGELS, ADAM, EVE, AND THE SER-
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through sex is a divine punishment for the original sin,
which has condemned the entire human stock. Jesus, of
course, is the only exception.46 That is why, he argues, Jesus
alone has the spiritual authority to teach us, to save us. Ac-
cording to Augustine, all children are born condemned and
rooted in sin, from which nothing but spiritual regeneration
may liberate.4" This theological axiom, which may still have
some credibility for the faithful, seems to have inspired Au-
gustine to denounce all manifestations of the sexual instinct
except the necessity of reproduction.
A. Sexual Repression
The Augustinian order is built on the assumption that
repression is necessary to regulate and channel sexual energy.
Augustine argues that the genital organs are not fully under
the control of the human will, that they are inherently un-
ruly.48 To make his point, he distinguishes the generative
organs from the other members of the human body. Except
the generative organs, he argues, all other members of the
human body, whether they are furnished with joints and
solid bones like the hands, feet, and fingers or whether they
are composed of slack and soft tissues like the muscles of
the mouth and face, are under the control of the human
will.49 These human organs can be moved at will: "We can
put them in motion, or stretch them out, or bend and twist
them, as we do with the muscles of the mouth and face."5 °
But the generative organs, he maintains, are moved by the
"heat of lust" and not by the human will. Indeed, the genera-
tive organs may even resist the authority of the human
will.51
PENT 107-110 (1988).
46. ST. AUGUSTINE, ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE, supra note 45, at 269.
47. St. Augustine, ON ORIGINAL SIN, book II, ch. 43, trans. in THE NICENE
AND POST NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH VOL. 5 at 252 (P. Holmes
& R. Wallis 1887) ("Where God did nothing else than by a just sentence to
condemn the man who wilfully sins, together with his stock; there also, as a
matter of course, whatsoever was even not yet born in justly condemned in its
sinful root.").
48. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, book 14, ch. 19, trans. in THE GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD VOL. 18 at 391 (M. Dods trans. 1952).
49. Id. at book 14, ch. 24.
50. Id.
51. Id. at book 14, chs. 15, 16, 19, 24.
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Phrases such as "human will" and "heat of lust" that
Augustine uses are now somewhat archaic, and they tend to
obscure the power of his analysis. For example, one might
attack his assertion that the heat of lust moves the genitals,
whereas the human will moves other parts of the human
body, on the ground that all human motions including the
excitation of the genitals are controlled by the human brain.
But when his phrases are translated into modern language,
they unfold a deeper meaning. If the heat of lust is the force
behind the sexual instinct and if the human will is the force
behind a deliberate act, then Augustine draws a defensible
distinction. For example, he defines lust as "a certain appe-
tite which is felt in the flesh like a craving, as hunger and
thirst .... ." (Almost sixteen hundred years later, Sigmund
Freud draws a similar parallel between the sexual instinct
and the instinct of hunger. Furthermore, Freud explains in a
footnote that "lust" is the only appropriate word in the Ger-
man language to describe "libido.")" Therefore, the instinc-
tual sexual energy (the heat of lust) that excites the genitals
may be differentiated from the volitional force that an indi-
vidual may use to commit an act. Stretching the arm for a
handshake, for example, is a deliberate act; but erection of
the penis may result from a non-volitional instinctual urge.
Therefore, when Augustine insists that the human genitals
are not fully under the control of the human will, he seems
to identify not only the instinctual nature of sexual excite-
ment, but also the unruly impulse of sexual instinct that may
resist and even disregard the commands of reason.53
Sexual instinct is not only inherently disobedient but the
pleasure that results from the union of the genitals, Augus-
tine states, is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. "So possess-
ing indeed is this pleasure that, at the moment of time in
which it is consummated, all mental activity is suspended." 54
52. Id. at book 14, ch. 15. Cf S. FREUD, supra note 16, at 1 n. 2.
53. For example, rape may occur when a strong sexual impulse defies ratio-
nal control. Until recently, psychodynamic studies portrayed rapists as mentally dis-
eased men with uncontrollable sexual impulses, but rape is now regarded as an
expression of violent behavior and pathological desire to control. L. BOURQUE,
DEFINING RAPE 59 (1989).
54. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, book 14, ch. 16, trans. in ST AUGUS-
TINE, THE CITY OF GOD, book 14, ch. 16, trans. in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WEST-
ERN WORLD VOL. 18 at 390 (M. Dods trans. 1952). This is, perhaps, the most
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Sexual excitement is not only forceful in its initiation, he
states, it is also exhilarating in its satisfaction. This is why the
sexual instinct is unruly. Recognizing both the power of sexu-
al excitement and the pleasure experienced in the act of
consummation, Augustine concludes that unchecked sexual
excitations pose grave moral danger. In the absence of "the
restraining bridle of reason," he maintains, the sexual energy
may lead individuals to commit all sorts of sexual acts indis-
criminately.55
In order to bring indiscriminate sexual excitations under
the authority of the human will, Augustine proposes to re-
press the sexual instinct. "[T]he organs of generation are so
subjected to the rule of lust, that they have no motion but
what it communicates. " " This blind energy built into the
sexual instinct (the heat of lust) needs "the regulation of
mind and reason."57 He seeks support from Cicero to argue
that disobedient sexual inclinations "must be treated as
slaves, and be coerced with a more stringent authority."58
Firm control on sexual excitations is needed, he suggests, to
"bridle and recall them from those objects to which they are
unlawfully moved, and give them access to those which the
law of wisdom sanctions. "" This sexual repression is justified
in order to contain the sexual instinct in morally acceptable
behavior. The power of the instinct is harnessed and guided
toward the right sexual partner, the right sexual practice and
the right sexual objective. Thus Augustine builds a structure
of religious neurosis and roots it in the law of wisdom.
The law of wisdom prefers sexual continence. But out of
regrettable necessity, it allows genital sex for procreation.
The sexual allowance even within marriage is limited: spouses
are required to engage only in genital sex for the sole pur-
pose of procreation. "Carnal concupiscence, however, must
not be ascribed to marriage: it is only to be tolerated in mar-
riage. It is not a good which comes out of the essence of
perfect definition of orgasm.
55. Id. at book 14, ch. 19.
56. Id
57. Id.
58. Id. at book 14, ch. 23.
59. I& at book 14, ch. 19 (emphasis added).
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marriage, but an evil which is the accident of original sin."6"
Furthermore, genital sex within the confines of conjugal chas-
tity is presented as a physical chore for the faithful, a brief
distraction from spirituality. Genital sex, Augustine mandates,
ought to give no pleasure to Christians. The union of male
and female for the purpose of procreation is the natural
good of marriage, but whoever abuses this good is akin to a
beast, particularly if the gratification of lust rather than pro-
creation is the sexual objective.6' Augustine also postulates
that genital organs are unclean and genital sex morally dirty.
Married Christians, therefore, ought to avoid sex as much as
possible. But whenever they engage in genital sex, they are
required, he insists, to clean themselves before participating
in religious services.6" In the Augustinian order, sexual plea-
sure is the opposite of Christian virtue. The two are mutually
exclusive, and oppose each other: sex versus Christianity.
Augustinian sexual repression works at two levels. First,
it shifts the focus and force of the sexual instinct from sex-
ual love to genital sex. Consequently, all potentially sexual
parts of the body except the genitals are morally and sexually
neutered. Since sexual love includes acts of sodomy, sexual
repression is needed to make genital sex the exclusive locus
of human sexuality, and to prohibit the instinctive drive to-
ward anal or oral sex. Second, it seeks to eliminate feelings
of passion or love from the experience of genital sex. Augus-
tine drives a moral wedge between procreation and pleasure,
arguing that even within marriage individuals may engage in
sex for procreation, but are not allowed to seek sex for plea-
sure. This existential split, acting as a kind of spiritual barri-
er, effectuates sexual repression among spouses and seeks to
turn procreative sex into a mechanical coupling of the geni-
tals, a process in which there is no pleasure, no passion, no
warmth. In the Augustinian sexual order, once married part-
ners accept the morality of conjugal chastity, they begin to
develop the discipline to unlearn the pleasure of lust, the joy
of sex, and eventually the urge to engage in genital sex. The
60. ST. AUGUSTINE, ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE, book 1, ch. 19, supra
note 45, at 271.
61. Id. at book 1, ch. 5.
62. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 81.
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more they avoid sexual temptations, the closer they draw to
the Augustinian ideal of sexual continence.
B. Duality
The Augustinian law of wisdom is simple: not to touch a
woman is the highest virtue that ought to be practiced by
the "strong;" conjugal chastity is next best, permitted to the
"weaker."63 The sexual order of duality divides up individu-
als into two distinct classes. The religious elite, the "Brah-
mans," must shun sexuality altogether, rejecting both sexual
pleasure and procreation, choosing a life without any sexual
contamination. They must remain virgin. Their self-denial,
their chastity, their celibacy represent the higher virtue, the
superior side of the sexual paradox.64 This holy virginity
emulates Jesus, "the Son of a virgin, and the spouse of vir-
gins, born after the flesh of a virgin womb, and wedded after
the Spirit in virgin marriage." 5 Sexual continence, Augus-
tine states, is the virtue of the soul: it is "the portion of
Angels, and a practice, in corruptible flesh, of perpetual in-
corruption. " " While the elite practices celibacy, the reli-
gious proletariat is allowed to engage in limited genital sex
for the sole purpose of procreation, keeping in mind that
sexual continence is the preferred value. The institution of
celibacy acts as a constant reminder to weaker members of
the community that good individuals stay away from plea-
sures of the flesh but perfect individuals are supposed to be
sexually dead. Thus the order of duality creates a cleavage
between pleasure and procreation, sex and spirituality, body
and soul, marriage and priesthood.
But Augustine does not stop here. His ideology takes
the next unfortunate step, justifying the inferiority of women.
He interweaves gender differentiation into the order of duali-
ty, assigning different values to men and women. He sees
hidden and prophetic significance in the biblical story that
63. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE MORALS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, ch. 35, quoted in
THE BASIC WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 356 (W. Oases ed. 1948).
64. Id. at 356 ("Not to touch a woman is the highest virtue, conjugal chastity
is the next best."). Conjugal chastity may be equated with the term 'singular rela-
tionship,' as used herein (see infra notes 73 and 74 and accompanying text).
65. ST. AUGUSTINE, OF HOLY VIRGINITY, para. 2 (P. Schaff ed. 1887 at 417).
66. Id. at 420, para. 12.
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Eve was formed from the side of Adam. Woman is not only
made from man: she is also made for him.67 She is inferior,
he argues, because Adam and not Eve was created first. "[I]t
is more consonant with the order of nature that men should
bear rule over women, than women over men."6" Thus as-
suming female inferiority, he begins to identify what is supe-
rior with the male and what is inferior with the female.
69
For example, in the dichotomy between sex and spirituality,
women embody sex, men incarnate spirituality; in the antith-
esis between body and soul, women constitute the body, men
represent the soul. Men epitomize the spiritual nature of the
human species, which deems sexual continence as an indis-
pensable prerequisite. Women personify the physical nature
of the species, which makes procreation a regrettable necessi-
ty.
Indeed, women are a regrettable necessity. "I fail to see
what use woman can be to man," Augustine concluded, "if
one excludes the function of bearing children."7" He be-
lieves that God created women for no other purpose than
breeding because they are not as good as men for anything
else. Furthermore, he argues that women are a source of
sexual temptation who distract men from higher pursuits.7
They are not even good companions, which implies that men
may seek women only for procreative sex and not for any
meaningful relationship. 72 But even when men engage in
procreative sex with women, he maintains, they must refrain
from any passionate involvement since the objective of their
sexual activity is simply to cause a pregnancy. Thus in the
Augustinian sexual order, the existential worth of a woman is
essentially utilitarian in that her greatest wealth is a repro-
ductive womb: she is the victim of the species, the beast of
burden, a useful object, but devoid of spirituality, serving no
higher cause in the grand plan of salvation. This
objectification of women, which denigrates their human dig-
67. K. BORRESEN, supra note 42, at 30-35.
68. ST. AUGUSTINE, ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE, book 1, ch. 10, supra
note 45, at 267.
69. K. BORRESEN, supra note 42, at 32.
70. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 85. (St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram
9-5-9).
71. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 85-86.
72. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 85.
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nity, their spiritual worth, and their existential integrity, be-
came for centuries a source of sexist bias and sexual exploita-
tion, justifying their subordination and subjection to men.
C. The Singular Relationship
While sexual continence is superior, the singular relation-
ship is the next most significant constitutive principle of the
Augustinian sexual order. The singular relationship provides
a moral structure within which spouses may engage in sex
for the purpose of procreation. Furthermore, the singular
relationship preserves the superiority of man over women,
since Augustine believes that in marriage man is the domi-
nant partner, the authority, the lord.7" He mentions with
approval notions such as "The head of the woman is the
man" and "Wives, submit yourself unto your own hus-
bands."74 Thus the singular relationship that Augustine envi-
sioned might be flawed according to contemporary thinking
for two reasons. First, it suppresses sexuality even between
lawful partners, by prohibiting sex for pleasure. Second, it
creates an unequal equation in which women are relegated
to a subordinate position. Despite these flaws, however, the
Augustinian concept of the singular relationship has main-
tained over the centuries its hold on familial consciousness.
Moreover, when these defects are eliminated, the singular
relationship, with its social respectability, becomes an almost
universal ideal.
The Augustinian order allows each individual to enter
into an intimate relationship with another individual of the
opposite sex, for life. Furthermore, it mandates that sexual
partners be married to each other. While an individual may
have several meaningful nonsexual relationships with others,
relational singularity permits only one intimate relationship
with another individual of the opposite sex; any second inti-
mate relationship would violate the concept of relational
singularity. It is morally wrong for unmarried persons to
engage in any sexual activity even if their sexual practice is
morally defensible and even if the objective of their sexual
73. ST. AUGUSTINE, ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE, book 1, ch. 10 supra
note 45, at 268. To support his view of male domination, Augustine quotes the
Apostle Peter: "Even as Sara obeyed Abraham, calling him lord." Id.
74. 1d. at 267.
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activity is to procreate. This is why fornication as well as the
decision to have a child out of wedlock are prohibited under
the Augustinian sexual order. The internal logic of the singu-
lar relationship requires that sex be limited to one's own
spouse. It outlaws adultery in the broadest sense: it is immor-
al for a married person to engage in sex with any third per-
son.
The singular relationship is not a secret relationship. It
is required that individuals undertake their relationship with
public knowledge. Thus marriage is essentially a formal act
by which two individuals of opposite sex announce the for-
mation of their singular relationship. The public exchange of
vows or wedding rings makes the intimate relationship le-
gitimate in the eyes of the community. Accordingly, the inti-
mate relationship is both private and public in nature. It is
private because the sexual activity must take place in privacy,
outside the public view. It is public because the intimate
relationship must be announced to the public. In fact, the
announcement must be made before engaging into any sexu-
al intercourse.
Even though marriage initiates the singular relationship,
the marital relationship is not synonymous with the singular
relationship. This becomes evident by examining the concept
of marital fidelity. Although the meaning of marital fidelity
may be expanded to outlaw sexual activity before and after
marriage, such an expansive definition strains the concept of
marital fidelity. The natural meaning of marital fidelity for-
bids spouses from engaging in any sexual relations with any
third person during the marriage. Marital fidelity by defini-
tion presupposes the existence of marriage. Therefore, sexual
activity outside of marriage does not breach marital fidelity.
For example, sexual relations that the spouses may have had
with unmarried third persons before entering into marriage
fall outside the definition of marital fidelity, as do sexual
relations that they may form with unmarried third persons
after the dissolution of their marriage. In other words, pre-
marital and extramarital fornication does not offend the no-
tion of marital fidelity.
The singular relationship, on the other hand, is a much
more comprehensive concept, and explains why premarital
and extramarital fornication, bigamy and divorce are prohib-
ited under the Augustinian sexual order. Once the singular
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relationship has been publicly consecrated, it of course re-
quires the partners to be faithful to each other. But the sin-
gular relationship prohibits any sexual relationship before
and after marriage. Premarital sex is prohibited because
there is no guarantee that the sexual partners will remain
together. Moreover, since premarital sex occurs without pub-
lic announcement of the singular relationship, individuals
may have several such secret relationships. Extramarital forni-
cation is a violation of the singular relationship because indi-
viduals are entitled to only one intimate relationship, which
they have already had in their marriage.
To reinforce the concept of the singular relationship, the
traditional moral code prohibits divorce. Augustine was per-
haps the first Christian intellectual who clearly formulated
the doctrine of marital indissolubility. 5 He argues that the
New Testament authorizes separation, but not termination of
marriage.7 6 Separation is not as detrimental to the concept
of the singular relationship as is the termination of marriage;
it leaves open the option to reunite and rebuild the strained
relationship. But the termination of marriage dissolves the
significance of the nuptial institution. To underscore the
significance of the sacramental bond, he specifically cites:
"Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What,
therefore, God hath joined together, let no man put asun-
der."77 The man and the woman joined together in matri-
mony, he states, should remain inseparable as long as they
live. Divorce is prohibited even if the marriage is "fruitless"
and would remain so in the future.7" "Thus between the
conjugal pair, as long as they live, the nuptial bond has a
permanent obligation, and can be cancelled neither by sepa-
ration nor by union with another." 9 Furthermore, the nup-
tial bond does not break even when the spouses practice
75. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 45, at 268. See also ST. AUGUSTINE, ON MAR-
RIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE, book 1, ch. 11 (P. Schaff ed. 1887 at 268).
76. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, book 14, ch. 22, trans. in GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, vol. 18, (M. Dods trans. 1952 at 393).
77. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, book 14, ch. 22, trans. in GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, vol. 18, (M. Dods trans. 1952 at 393). See Mat-
thew 19:4, 5.
78. ST. AUGUSTINE, ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE, book 1, ch. 11, supra
note 45, at 268).
79. Id.
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sexual abstinence.8" Under Augustinian morality, divorce ex-
hibits the frailty of moral commitment; it weakens the hu-
man will to nurture and preserve the nuptial bond; it under-
mines the mystique of the singular relationship.
In order to further preserve the singular relationship,
Augustine opposes polygamy and remarriage. Polygamy is
prohibited because a plural marriage is antithetical to the
idea of the singular relationship. Augustine explains away the
polygamous practices of the prophets and holy fathers of
olden times, suggesting that they had a plurality of wives not
for sexual gratification but for the multiplication of their off-
spring.81 He further argues that the time before Christ was
a time for propagation, but that since Christ it has been a
time for sexual continence.8" Therefore, there is now no
excuse for polygamy. The very first union of Adam and Eve,
he argues, shows plainly enough that the good of marriage is
better promoted by the singular relationship.83 The concept
of monogamy in contemporary meaning prohibits a concur-
rent plural marriage; it does not prevent consecutive marriag-
es. The Augustinian sexual order forbids concurrent polyga-
my; but by banning divorce it also preempts consecutive
polygamy, further reinforcing the concept of the singular
relationship.
If marriage is terminated by the death of a spouse, sec-
ond marriage would be prohibited under a strict definition
of the singular relationship. 4 Augustine, however, seems to
allow remarriage after the death of a spouse: "If the husband
die, with whom a true marriage was made, a true marriage is
now possible by a connection which would before have been
adultery." 5 Despite this concession, he commends the singu-
80. l& book 1, ch. 11 at 268.
81. Id. book 1, ch. 9 at 267. Augustine explains why women were not al-
lowed to have a plurality of husbands. The reason that it was lawful for one man,
he asserts, to have a plurality of wives was for producing a greater number of
children. While a man may need several women to multiply procreation, a wom-
en, he argues, does not need several men to produce more children. Id. bk. 1,
ch. 10 at 268.
82. Id. at book 1, ch. 14 at 269.
83. Id. at book 1, ch. 10 at 267.
84. Nature may terminate marriage, but it does not dissolve the singular rela-
tionship.
85. ST. AUGUSTINE, ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE, book 1, ch. 11 (P.
Schaff ed. 1887 at 268).
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lar relationship.86 After all, under the Augustinian order
sexual continence is always a superior Christian value. Thus a
married Christian who has children but whose spouse has
died would have little justification to enter a second mar-
riage. Any such justification is further weakened if the spouse
dies in old age."7
The fortification of the singular relationship is flawless.
Prohibition against fornication encourages individuals to en-
ter into the singular relationship; prohibition against adultery
preserves the relationship from internal subversion; prohibi-
tion against divorce protects the relationship from dissolu-
tion; prohibition against polygamy keeps the relationship
singular. The concept of the singular relationship may be
rooted in the misreading of the New Testament. Neverthe-
less, it has traditionally embodied a romantic ideal, the ulti-
mate definition of mutual human commitment.
D. The Procreation Principle
In addition to sexual continence and relational singu-
larity, the procreation principle is essential to the Augustini-
an sexual order. This principle makes procreation the exclu-
sive lawful sexual objective and genital sex the exclusive law-
ful sexual practice. All non-procreative sexual practices in-
cluding anal and oral sex are therefore morally wrong and
prohibited. The procreation principle demands that sexual
partners be none other but persons of the opposite sex.
Therefore, persons of the same sex may not enter into a
singular relationship because sexual- practices available to
homosexuals are essentially non-procreative. But even a het-
erosexual couple has no moral excuse or justification to vio-
late the principle of procreation and indulge in anal or oral
sex. Traditional moral proscriptions against all forms of sod-
omy therefore flow from the logic of the procreation princi-
ple.
86. ST. AUGUSTINE, ON THE GOOD OF WIDOWHOOD, supra note 45, para. 16
at 447.
87. Id.
You see how the holy widow is not only commended in this, that she
had one husband, but also, that she had lived few years with a hus-
band from her virginity, and had with so great service of piety contin-
ued her office of widowed chastity even unto so great age.
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The procreation principle may be further extended to
formulate appropriate moral standards regarding the use of
contraceptives. Since the moral objective of genital sex is
exclusively procreation, any sexual love for pleasure may be
morally forbidden, even in the singular relationship. For
example, married couples may not engage in anal or oral sex
because the objective of such sexuality is essentially
non-procreative. But they may not engage in even genital sex
if they have no intention to procreate. Augustine considered
it a grave sin for married couples to engage in genital sex
but avoid procreation."8 This moral stricture, then, would
forbid the use of contraceptives. Contraceptives prevent pro-
creation, subverting thereby the natural and moral objective
of genital sex; moreover, genital sex using contraceptives has
no purpose other than pleasure, that is, recreation. Since sex
for pleasure violates the procreation principle, a ban on the
use of contraceptives is consistent with the Augustinian or-
der.
Furthermore, abortion is forbidden. 9 Once again, the
logic for banning abortion flows from the procreation prin-
ciple. Abortion vitiates procreation: it destroys the moral
objective for which genital sex, an otherwise morally regret-
table physical act, is tolerated in the realm of chastity and
celibacy. Abortion within marriage is the complete antithesis
of procreation: it is a deliberate rejection of the mission of
genital sex, a violent rebellion against its core value. Abor-
tion is, therefore, offensive to the Augustinian order, particu-
larly when it is sought to avoid the unintended consequence
of playful, non-procreative sexuality, which is itself immoral
according to that order.
Under the combined force of the singular relationship
88. J. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 89.
89. According to Augustine, married couples who attempt to prevent procre-
ation through evil agencies are condemned:
Sometimes . . . cruel lust resorts to such extravagant methods as to
use poisonous drugs to secure barrenness; or else if unsuccessful in
this, to destroy the conceived seed by some means previous to birth,
preferring that its offspring should rather perish than receive vitality;
or if it was advancing to life within the womb, should be slain before
it was born.
ST. AUGUSTINE, ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE, book 1, ch. 17 trans. in THE
NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, vol. 5 (P. Holmes & R. Wallis trans.
1887), supra note 45, at 271.
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and the procreation principle, Augustine has introduced into
consciousness a formidable religious neurosis which each
generation has glorified in its law and morality and faithfully
transmitted it to its children. The sexual order rooted in
religious neurosis is complete, clear and coherent. The right
sexual partner is one's spouse; the right sexual practice is the
union of the genitals; the right sexual objective is procre-
ation. Any other sexual partner, any other sexual practice,
any other sexual objective is morally forbidden. Therefore,
proscriptions against fornication, adultery, polygamy, sodomy,
use of contraceptives and abortion flow naturally from the
intrinsic logic of the principles of procreation and the singu-
lar relationship, the two pillars of the Augustinian sexual
order. One might disagree with the moral code that Augus-
tine constructed some sixteen hundred years ago, but its
structural integrity and coherence, like that of an old cathe-
dral, is impeccable. From a contemporary Western perspec-
tive, however, the traditional sexual order is inconsistent with
new freedoms that individuals have begun to cherish. The
concept of the singular relationship, for example, may still be
attractive to some. To others, however, it is a moral prison.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFORMITY
The Augustinian consciousness has remained a potent
force in shaping the sexual order in the United States.90
Not too long ago almost all states had statutes against forni-
cation, adultery, cohabitation, bigamy, sodomy, contraceptives
and abortion.9' Even though divorce was available, grounds
for obtaining a divorce were often restricted and difficult to
90. The Catholic religious elite, for example, still practice celibacy, and the
Catholic church still encourages people to adhere to the singular relationship. In
the United States, it is not uncommon to find people from many different creeds
within Christianity who remain monogamous throughout their lives, and who cher-
ish the concept of the singular relationship. This is striking in a country where
the majority of the people are neither born nor raised in an Augustinian tradi-
tion. One might conclude that most Christian denominations, despite their sectari-
an differences and historical antagonism, share the same collective subconscious, at
least in the area of sexual love, in that the concept of the singular relationship is
so deeply rooted in their conscience.
91. M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAw 136-164, 195-215 (1951) (exploring the
prohibitions against fornication, adultery and other non-conventional sexual behav-
ior).
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prove.92 The legal and moral culture, rooted in the religious
neurosis of the Augustinian order, inculcated among the citi-
zens of the United States a deep aspiration for the singular
relationship, and married couples nurtured mutual expecta-
tions of the permanence of their relationships. Even today,
the vows traditionally exchanged on the wedding day solicit
from each partner a total commitment to the marriage, and
emphasize the permanence of marriage. Even for those who
reject the theological basis of sexual love, the idea underlying
the singular relationship has a profound romantic appeal.
The remnants of the Augustinian order may be found in tra-
ditional households, where the husband is still the dominant
partner and the wife is confined to the role of producing
and raising children.93 Gender equality is still largely illuso-
ry, because men control the political, economic and religious
affairs of the community, from which women are systemati-
cally excluded.94 It would therefore be premature to con-
clude that the era of religious neurosis has come to an end.
This section examines the relationship between the Au-
gustinian sexual order and constitutional jurisprudence. Even
though, in the past few decades, constitutional jurisprudence
has begun to drift away from the traditional sexual order, it
is important to discuss the extent to which the constitutional
jurisprudence has been and still is compatible with religious
neurosis. As discussed earlier, religious neurosis suppresses
the sexual instinct to achieve two distinct objectives: first, it
proposes the concept of the singular relationship, outlawing
fornication, adultery, bigamy and divorce. Second, it advances
the procreation principle, outlawing sodomy, recreational sex,
contraceptives and abortion. These objectives constitute the
core of the traditional sexual order.95 This section argues
that constitutional jurisprudence still protects, to a large ex-
92. M. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 188 (1989).
93. This inferior status of women derives its validity from the Augustinian
notion that God created women just for breeding.
94. R. SIMPSON, supra note 10, at 14-27. See generally N. MCGLEN & K.
O'CONNER, WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1983); V. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC
EQUALITY (1988).
95. There is yet another dimension of religious neurosis, which justifies the
inferiority of women and denigrates them as the source of sexual temptation who
lead men away from higher pursuits. Religious neurosis treats women as mere
reproductive objects whom God created for no other purpose than procreation
and who were destined to be subservient to men.
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tent, the concept of the singular relationship as well as the
principle of procreation, the two fundamental projections of
religious neurosis.
Private conformity with the Augustinian sexual order is
fully compatible with the United States Constitution. For
example, if someone wants to be a celibate, he or she may
do so without any constitutional obstacle: sexual continence
is constitutional. Similarly, if individuals embrace the concept
of the singular relationship, there is nothing in the Consti-
tution that forbids them to do so. If individuals choose to
refrain from premarital fornication, no state or federal law
can force them to conduct such sexual relations. Even if a
state has repealed the fornication statute, its citizens are un-
der no legal duty to indulge in premarital sex. Likewise mar-
ried couples are under no obligation to breach marital fideli-
ty, even if the state does not enforce the law against adul-
tery. Moreover, they may renounce divorce, as they may
renounce the concept of remarriage after the death of a
spouse. They are free to make the ultimate commitment to
stay permanently in the singular relationship that they have
lawfully contracted. Furthermore, the Constitution does not
require married couples to engage in anal or oral sex, nor
does it mandate that they use contraceptives. They may reject
all forms of contraceptives, abortion and recreational sex:
they may engage in sexual activity for procreation only.
While the Augustinian sexual order if privately embraced
does not offend the Federal Constitution, the question re-
mains whether the state can enact constitutionally valid stat-
utes to impose such a concept on its citizens. Principles of
federalism confer upon states the power to regulate mar-
riage, divorce and sexual morality.96 Historically, regulation
of domestic relations and public morality have been the state
prerogative. °7 It is within the states that the people live,
marry, procreate and maintain their relationships under laws
passed by their elected representatives, which will normally
reflect the morals of the people of the state. Thus, the states
96. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (holding that domestic relations
is an area within the exclusive provinces of states). In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 734-35, the Court affirmed the State's absolute right to prescribe conditions
for marriage and divorce.
97. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); Bowers v. Hardwich, 478 U.S.
186, 196 (1986).
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preserve a stable social order in which the citizens lead their
lives according to their beliefs, aspirations and morals. Yet
the power of the states over their citizens' intimate relation-
ships is not without limitation. The Federal Constitution
protects certain fundamental freedoms and individual rights,
which the state may not take away in the name of collective
morality."8 On the other hand, the Constitution recognizes
certain rights such as marriage and procreation which facili-
tate the enforcement of traditional sexual order.
A. The Singular Relationship
Constitutional jurisprudence protects marriage as a basic
civil right."9 Of course, the Constitution does not require
that individuals be married. Marriage is not a constitutional
compulsion; individuals are free to remain celibate. However,
constitutional jurisprudence describes marriage as fundamen-
tal to the very existence and survival of the human race.'00
(This conception of marriage is intriguing in the context of
religious neurosis. The Supreme Court seems to believe there
is a fundamental relationship between marriage and the per-
petuation of the species through procreation, even though
the fallacy of this argument is rather evident, given that the
survival of the human race depends on reproduction and not
upon the institution of marriage). No state may lawfully
adopt a legal scheme to prevent marriages between consent-
ing men and women. The state may impose reasonable regu-
lations relating to prerequisites for marriage, but it cannot
interfere directly and substantially with the right to mar-
ry. 101 For example, the state cannot prohibit interracial
marriages."0 2 By invalidating state miscegenation statutes,
constitutional jurisprudence restored the hermeneutic order
which slavery and racism had disturbed. Similarly, state stat-
utes cannot deny poor people the right to marry.'03 Ac-
cording to Justice Stewart, the state may not prohibit what it
98. See Khan, Invasion of Sexual Privay, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 971-72
(1986).
99. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942).
100. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
101. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978).
102. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
103. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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considers to be financially irresponsible marriages. 10 4 Chief
Justice Warren summed up the significance of marriage in
the following words: "The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. " ' °5
In addition to the institution of marriage, constitutional
jurisprudence has protected several other pillars of the Au-
gustinian sexual order that fortify the singular relationship.
First, it has allowed states to ban nonmarital sex.'06 Conse-
quently, a state may lawfully prevent and even punish pre-
marital and extramarital sex. According to Justice Goldberg,
safeguarding marital fidelity is a legitimate state interest; and
the constitutionality of carefully tailored statutes that prohibit
adultery and fornication is beyond doubt."0 7 Fornication
and adultery, Justice Harlan has argued, are not immune
from criminal inquiry.0 8 Right now, several states have re-
pealed fornication statutes and where such statutes still exist
they are rarely enforced;0 9 similarly, adultery statutes have
become almost moribund."0 This relaxation, however, does
not diminish the power of religious neurosis underlying con-
stitutional jurisprudence which allows laws against adultery to
preserve marital fidelity and laws against fornication to safe-
guard the concept of relational singularity. Should there be a
religious revival, laws against nonmarital sex could be resur-
104. Id.
105. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
106. Here, a major distinction must be noted. The Supreme Court has indicat-
ed that state fornication and adultery statutes are constitutional, which means that
the state has the moral authority to enforce the marital principle; accordingly, it
may forbid any and all sex outside of marriage. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (state statutes prohibiting fornication
and adultery, i.e., nonmarital sex are constitutional). And yet states are under no
constitutional obligation to legislate or enforce the marital principle. For example,
a state will commit no constitutional wrong if it repeals the fornication statute, as
several states have. Similarly, a state may refuse to enforce or even repeal the
adultery statute. Thus, the Constitution allows but does not mandate that states
enforce the marital principle.
107. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring.)
108. Id. at 499 (Goldman, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
109. Schneider, Moral Discoune and the Transformation of American Family Law,
83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1818 (1985) (showing that statutes against fornication,
adultery and cohabitation either have been repealed or not enforced).
110. Id.
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rected without any constitutional objection.
Second, in conformity with the traditional sexual order,
and further supporting the singular relationship, constitution-
al jurisprudence has condemned polygamy as an odious and
notorious example of promiscuity, which has "long been
branded as immoral in the law.""' The Court has ruled
that the state has a "perfect right" to outlaw polygamy."
2
All states do. But should a state refuse to prohibit polyga-
mous practices, Congress may lawfully intervene to defeat
such practices. This interference by Congress with the police
powers of the states, the Court holds, does not amount to an
unconstitutional interference." 3 However, the question re-
mains whether the states, in the absence of a federal statute
outlawing polygamy, are under a constitutional obligation to
prevent and punish polygamous practices. Is there any legal
principle embodied in the Constitution that forbids bigamy?
This question has not yet been decided. The Court's un-
equivocal denunciation of polygamy, however, may be inter-
preted in support of the argument that states are required to
prohibit bigamy." 4 But even if the Constitution does not
require such a proscription, it allows states to enforce the
singular relationship to the extent that no individual may
have a plural marriage. A plural marriage, the Court has
stated, "is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the
civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western
world." 15 This statement shows the power of religious neu-
rosis and its impact on a constitutional jurisprudence that
claims to require the separation of state and religion." 6
111. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946).
112. The Late Corp. of the Church of the Latter-day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 50 (1890) (hereinafter Morman Church v. United States).
113. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946).
114. However, in the absence of state and federal laws prohibiting polygamy, a
good case may be made that a consensual plural marriage supported by a reli-
gious belief may not violate the Constitution.
115. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890); see Cleveland v.
United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946) (citing with approval Morman Church v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890)).
116. The separation of church and state is a fundamental norm protected in
the United States. "The First Amendment teaches that a government neutral in
the field of religion better serves all religious interests." This is what Justice
Douglas noted in Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). Although the courts have enforced the separation of church and state prin-
ciples against the executive and legislative branches of the government, it may be
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The prohibition against bigamy may be justifiable on secular
grounds; nonetheless, constitutional jurisprudence seems to
depend on religious models for its validation, and not on
secular paradigms."' Furthermore, the religious neurosis
underlying constitutional jurisprudence is essentially Chris-
tian, because it discredits other religions that do not embrace
the notion of the singular relationship. Islam, for example,
allows polygamy. Even under the Mormon faith, a sect of
Christianity, polygamy was permitted. But Moslems and Mor-
mons cannot practice their hermeneutics of sexual love, even
though the Constitution recognizes the freedom of reli-
gion." 8 The first amendment, the crown jewel of constitu-
tional freedoms, offers no protection for a plural marriage.
Individuals may not invoke their religious beliefs to practice
polygamy, and religion is no defense in a prosecution for
bigamy." 9 Indeed any religious community that spreads
and practices polygamy, the Court has pronounced, invites "a
return to barbarism." 20
Third, constitutional jurisprudence has failed to state in
unequivocal terms that individuals have a right to divorce.
Certainly, no Supreme Court case has held that the Constitu-
tion requires states to outlaw divorce. However, the question
whether the Constitution allows a state to ban divorce merits
some discussion. Right now, divorce is available in all states;
and the trend is toward relaxing the restrictions on obtaining
a divorce.12' In the United States, a divorce must be ob-
tained through the state judicial machinery; individuals can-
not dissolve their marriages without state approval. 22 Given
the monopolization of the means for legal termination of
marriages, different states have placed different substantive
and procedural restrictions on the granting of a divorce. The
Supreme Court has reviewed a few restrictions on obtaining
a divorce. In a key case, for example, the Court held that
further argued that even the courts should refrain from using religious arguments
to support a legal conclusion.
117. The holding against bigamy in Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S.
1 (1980), for example, is partly rooted in religious rhetoric. Id. at 49.
118. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890).
119. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165, 167 (1878).
120. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1889).
121. M. GLENDON, supra note 92, at 188-89.
122. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
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due process of law prohibits a state from denying access to
its courts to indigents who seek dissolution of their marriage
but who cannot afford court fees and costs.13 In a subse-
quent case, the Court remarked that one's inability to dis-
solve a marriage seriously impairs the freedom to "pursue
other protected associational activities."124 On the basis of
these cases, one might argue that individuals have a right to
dissolve their unhappy marriages so that they may pursue a
more meaningful relationship or another marriage. A state's
categorical refusal to grant divorces might advance the cause
of the singular relationship, but it would place an unreason-
able restriction on individual liberty and pursuit of happi-
ness.'25 Yet the Supreme Court has not held divorce to be
a fundamental right, entitled to constitutional protection. In
the absence of such a constitutional right, it can be argued
that the states have the authority to ban divorce altogether.
It is unlikely, of course, that any state in the foreseeable
future will ban divorce, absent a profound moral revolution
and the resurrection of the concept of the singular relation-
ship.
B. The Procreation Principle
Procreation, the raison d'etre of genital love in the Augus-
tinian sexual order, is also a fundamental right recognized in
the constitutional jurisprudence. 2 ' It is a legitimate sexual
objective that no state can prohibit without strict judicial
scrutiny. The Court struck down a statute that authorized the
state to sterilize habitual criminals convicted two or more
times for crimes amounting to felonies involving moral turpi-
tude. "' 7 Sterilization, Justice Douglas argued, inflicts upon
individuals an irreparable injury and thus forever deprives
them of the right to procreate. 28 The power to sterilize, he
further argued, may have devastating effects, particularly if it
is in evil or reckless hands. 2 9 In another case, Justice
123. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
124. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1973).
125. Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 22 B.C.L. REV. 935, 983
(1981).
126. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942).
127. Id. at 538.
128. Id. at 535, 541.
129. Id. at 541.
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Goldberg remarked that a law requiring compulsory birth
control would be unconstitutional because the Constitution
forbids such totalitarian limitation of family size.1 30 To the
question why procreation is a basic right in the United
States, several explanations may be given. Judges use the
language of law and rights to underscore the significance of
procreation. However, another explanation could be that the
Augustinian consciousness is so deeply rooted in people that
collective religious neurosis compels them to treat procre-
ation as sacred.' Sacred or not, the right to procreation is
a basic civil right protected as much in the constitutional ju-
risprudence as it is in the Augustinian sexual order.
Prohibition of homosexuality has been a natural exten-
sion of the procreation principle under the Augustinian sexu-
al order. Homosexuality is considered unnatural because it is
nonprocreative; it therefore not only subverts the procreation
principle, but legitimizes recreational sex. Mirroring the Au-
gustinian sexual order, constitutional jurisprudence condemns
homosexual relationships. The Supreme Court has declared
that the states have the authority to criminalize homosexual
sodomy, and that the right of privacy does not allow homo-
sexuals to enter into an intimate relationship. 3 ' Since law
is consistently based on notions of morality, the Court ar-
gued, majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuali-
ty may be an adequate basis to outlaw homosexual sod-
omy. 13 In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger in-
voked religious morality to suggest that proscriptions against
homosexuality had ancient roots in the history of Western
Civilization."' To hold that homosexuality is a fundamental
right protected under the Constitution, he argued, "would be
130. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring).
131. This explanation is lent some credibility by the observation that China, a
non-Christian society, does not consider procreation to be sacred. In China, the
government has used several legal techniques to discourage and even punish un-
limited procreation. J. BARTON, J. GIBBS, V. Li & J. MERRYMAN, LAW IN RADICAL-
LY DIFFERENT CULTURES 923-49 (1983). Of course, this explanation is subject to
the criticism that China's birth control policies are explained by the fact that it is
a totalitarian state, or that it is justified in pursuing such policies because of its
large population and persistent poverty.
132. Hardwick v. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 190, 191 (1986).
133. Id. at 196.
134. Id. at 196-97.
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to cast aside millennia of moral teaching."'35 Here is the
rub. Constitutional jurisprudence presents itself as a prisoner
of the moral conscience that Augustine shaped centuries ago.
It cannot cast aside sixteen centuries in which religious neu-
rosis against nonprocreative sexual practices grew, developed
and flourished, shaping a deep prejudice against homosexual-
ity 136it . i s
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVIATION
In the past few decades, the traditional sexual order in
the United States has undergone a profound transformation.
In several states, fornication and anti-cohabitation statutes
have been repealed, and adultery statutes are rarely en-
forced.'"7 The divorce rate is high, remarriage is common,
and cohabitation is on the rise.33 Citizens have a constitu-
tional right to procure contraceptives in order to avoid pro-
creation and to engage in purely recreational sex. 139 Abor-
tion is legal and available, despite recent protests, legislative
initiatives and Supreme Court holdings. 40 Homosexual cou-
ples have begun to live together, and the laws against sod-
omy are seldom enforced. 14 1 Pornographic magazines, mov-
135. Id. at 197.
136. But see R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, 125 (1990). Bork supports
the Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), arguing
that the "fact that a moral view is embodied in religious doctrine does not con-
vert either the view or the doctrine into religious intolerance." R. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA at 125.
137. Schneider, supra note 109, at 1818.
138. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES (1990). Table No. 51 shows the increase in the rate of
divorce (47 per 1,000 in 1970 to 133 in 1,000 in 1988); Table 127 shows the
increase in the rate of remarriage (16.5 percent in 1970 to 23.4 percent in 1988);
Table 54 shows the increase in the rate of cohabitation (523,000 in 1970 to
2,588,000 in 1988).
139. Carey v. Population. Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down state
bans on distribution of contraceptives by nonpharmacists and on advertising of
contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down state ban
on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state law forbidding use of contraceptives by
married persons).
140. In light of recent pro-life protests, there was widespread speculation that
the Supreme Court would overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This has
not yet happened, even though the Court has begun to nibble away the outer
limits of Roe v. Wade. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct.
3040 (1989).
141. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)
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ies and videotapes that accentuate erotic love may be lawfully
purchased in the open market. 4 2 A culture of sexual free-
dom has set in, liberating the individual from the bondage of
old sexual order.
In opposition to the traditional sexual order, a
counter-paradigm has emerged in social consciousness, as
well as in legal discourse. This is the principle of consensual
sex, which proposes that any sexual practice between adults,
engaged in privacy, is a matter of individual morality, and
that the state may not intervene to enforce any specific sexu-
al code."' So defined, consensual sex is the antithesis of
the Augustinian sexual order and of religious neurosis, and
provides a philosophical and functional structure to disman-
tle the religious fortification of sexuality: the procreation
principle and the singular relationship. This section discusses
the principle of consensual sex and the related constitutional
concept of privacy. It also examines the extent to which con-
stitutional jurisprudence has drifted away from the traditional
sexual order. Furthermore, it is shown that despite constitu-
tional deviations, there seems to have emerged with respect
to the treatment of women an inverted association between
constitutional jurisprudence and religious neurosis.
A. Consensual Sex & Privacy
Although constitutional jurisprudence has not embraced
the paradigm of consensual sex- as a constitutional princi-
ple, 144 it has recognized a similar concept called the right
of privacy. 145 In many ways, the principle of consensual sex
(indicating the moribund character of sodomy statutes).
142. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, DUKE L.J. 589 (1986).
143. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 800 (1986).
144. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court said: "[A]ny claim
that . . . any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is consti-
tutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable." Id. at 191.
145. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right of privacy,
dealing with sexual matters in several cases. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down state bans on distribution of contracep-
tives by nonpharmacists and on advertising of contraceptives); Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (limiting state power to regulate abortions); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down state ban on abortions); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down state ban on distribution of contracep-
tives to unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking
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and the right of privacy share a profound kinship. Both tend
to protect adult sexual activity formed on mutual consent
and exercised within the precincts of personal quarters.148
Both are inclined to free the individual from theological sup-
pression as well as from unwanted government intrusion. 47
Both carry the potential to unravel the moral web that the
traditional sexual order has woven around the sexual instinct,
and challenge the superego guarding the fortress of religious
neurosis. Nonetheless, the principle of consensual sex is a
much broader concept, repudiating the moral authority of
the state to intervene and police private sexual affairs of con-
senting adults. Comparatively, the right of privacy recognized
in constitutional jurisprudence is a rather conservative doc-
trine, intended primarily to protect marital privacy.141 In
recent Supreme Court cases, although the right of privacy
has been expanded to protect unmarried individuals, consti-
tutional jurisprudence has declined to embrace fully the new
paradigm of consensual sex. It might be useful first to dis-
cuss the consensual principle and its potential for effectively
countering the Augustinian sexual order.
1. The Consensual Principle
Both in its reach and philosophical clarity, the principle
of consensual sex presents a powerful paradigm to repudiate
the traditional sexual order. 49 Rejecting almost all tradi-
tional restraints placed on sex, the consensual principle pro-
tects the right of individuals to select consenting adult sex
down state law forbidding use of contraceptives by married persons).
146. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 305, 339-40 (1987) (arguing that the right of private consensual sex
is protected under the unenumerated natural rights retained by the people in the
ninth amendment of the United States Constitution).
147. Id But see People v. Onofre, 415 N.E. 2d 936, 940 n.3 (striking down the
anti-sodomy statute but declining to express any theological evaluation of con-
sensual sodomy).
148. "The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly un-
derlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that rights to marital privacy and to mar-
ry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental
rights specifically protected." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965).
149. See generally Massey, supra note 146; Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and
Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445 (1983);
Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Pet-ons in the
United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
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partners. The principle is founded upon the integration of
three simple ideas. First, it allows sexual activity between
adult partners only. Sex with a child or a minor is not pro-
tected under the principle. Second, the adult sexual partners
must mutually consent to engage in a sexual act. Any forced
sexual activity against the will of a sexual partner falls outside
the boundaries of the principle. In fact, the principle does
not protect a forced sexual act even with one's spouse: indi-
viduals may be lawfully punished for raping their spous-
es. 5' Third, the sexual act between consenting adults must
take place in privacy. Public sexual acts even between con-
senting adults are not protected. Hence, a state may regulate
and punish sexual acts involving children, elements of force
and public exposure. But the principle prohibits the govern-
ment from preventing or punishing any sexual act engaged
in privacy between consenting adult partners.
The consensual principle dismantles traditional barriers
regarding sexual partners and sexual practices. In fact, it
stands the Augustinian sexual order on its head. For exam-
ple, the principle does not require that. sexual partners be
married. Of course, the principle does not reject the institu-
tion of marriage and if consenting adults wish to confine
their sexual activity within a marital framework, they may do
so. Nonetheless, marriage is not an essential moral prerequi-
site for engaging in sexual activity. In fact, the marital status
is immaterial under the consensual principle. 5' Couples are
150. Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1255 (1986) (arguing that the subordination of
women was accomplished by the absence of laws restraining male power.); see
generally D. RUSSEL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982). In People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y. 2d
152, 474 N.E. 2d 567 (1984), the marital rape exemption was removed. In Warren
v. State, 225 Ga. 151, 336 S.E. 2d 221 (1985), it was held that the rape statute
does not incorporate the common law exemption. Several states have enacted
statutes to punish marital rape. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West Supp.
1988):
a) Rape of a person who is the spouse of a perpetrator is an act of
sexual intercourse accomplished against the will of the spouse by
means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on
the spouse or another, or where the act is accomplished against the
victim's will by threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim
or any other person, and there is a reasonable possibility that the
perpetrator will execute the threat . ...
151. Fornication statutes that prohibit sexual intercourse outside a lawful mar-
riage would be incompatible with the principle of consensual sex. Similarly, the
consensual principle rejects the concept of adultery.
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under no obligation to announce their alliance to the public;
nor are they required to formalize their relationship before
any church or state official. The consensual principle rejects
the traditional definition of lawful sex, which presupposes a
marital bond. Accordingly, the prohibition against fornication
loses its logical meaning. The principle dismantles the moral
boundary between marital and premarital sex, between mar-
riage and cohabitation.
Furthermore, the consensual principle deconstructs the
moral foundation of the singular relationship. It allows indi-
viduals to engage in extramarital sexual acts based on con-
sent. Thus the traditional proscription against adultery is
incompatible with the consensual principle. It has been ar-
gued that the consensual principle may not be extended to
permit adultery because marriage is distinguishable from
cohabitation and other sexual relations based on weaker
mutual commitment: in marriage, spouses take a pledge of
fidelity and therefore extramarital sex may have an adverse
impact upon the nonparticipating spouse or spouses.152
This is true. The consensual principle, however, does not
draw formalistic distinctions between marital and nonmarital
vows. From the viewpoint of the consensual principle, if mu-
tual commitment has weakened, formal vows may not pre-
vent partners from engaging in sex outside their declared
relationship. On the other hand, if the bond is intact the
partners would remain faithful to each other even in the
absence of a formal commitment. Therefore, if vows of fideli-
ty are breached, the consensual principle accepts in a realistic
spirit the flaw in the existing relationship rather than con-
demning the act of infidelity. The consensual principle does
not discard the idea of relational fidelity; it only declines to
punish the breach of such a commitment. In other words,
the legitimacy of sex flows from mutual consent, not from
any formal status.'
152. G. BUCHANAN, MORALITY, SEX, AND THE CONSTITUTION 99 (1985).
153. The consensual principle is primarily intended to protect consensual sex-
ual activity between two adult sexual partners. But the principle may be extended
to encompass polygamy and group sex. If two or more adult partners freely
choose to enter into a plural marriage or a plural relationship, the consensual
principle does not preclude their consensual decision. The principle would expand
the traditional meaning of polygamy under which a man could have multiple
spouses but a woman could not: it would allow both men and woman to practice
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To further promote liberation from religious neurosis,
the consensual principle allows sexual practices prohibited
under the traditional sexual order. Religious neurosis equates
sex with procreation and forbids all non-procreative sexual
practices. The consensual principle does not limit itself to
procreation or to genital sex. It allows anal and oral sex.
Therefore, it does not discriminate against homosexuality, the
so-called deviant sexual behavior. 54 Nor does it condemn
heterosexual sodomy. Furthermore, the principle rejects tradi-
tional constraints of the procreation principle placed on geni-
tal sex. Sexual partners are free to use or not to use contra-
ceptives. They may of course engage in procreative sex if
they want to have a child. But they are free to seek recre-
ational sex as well. In fact, they may shun the procreative
objective altogether and may pursue sex exclusively for plea-
sure. The consensual principle allows both heterosexual and
homosexual partners to experience erotic pleasure without
legal or moral recrimination. In the animated eroticism of
mutuality, the consensual principle does not interpose any
moral stop signs.
The consensual principle may be criticized on the
ground that it promotes promiscuity and mechanical sex.
This permissiveness may be condemned on the basis of reli-
gious neurosis, but the specter of sexual excess may not be
consensual polygamy. Traditional state statutes prohibiting even consensual polyga-
my, therefore, would have no validity under the consensual principle. Similarly the
consensual principle would not constrain a group of adults from engaging in a
private sexual act that involves more than two sexual partners. The logical outer
limits of the consensual principle would even allow incestuous sexual relationships
between consenting adults. Nonetheless, most legal scholars are reluctant to em-
brace such an expansive application of the principle. See e.g., Strickman, Marriage,
Divorce, and the Constitution, 22 B.C.L. REV. 935, 958-59 (showing that public
morality may still argue against marriages between certain family relations); H.
CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMEsTic RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 83-4 (1988)
(indicating the need to have a uniform legislation on incestuous marriages). Excep-
tions have been carved out to suggest that consensual incest may be prohibited.
These exceptions, while understandable from a moral viewpoint, weaken the
internal consistency of the consensual principle. If the consensual principle may be
limited in cases of incest, and if exceptions to the principle are required to
preserve certain core tenets of traditional morality, the consensual principle loses
some of its coherence and independence. Such exceptions indicate that complete
freedom from traditional sexual morality may be impossible, and is almost certain-
ly unacceptable even under contemporary social norms.
154. Of course, the principle does not inquire whether the partners engaging
in homosexual sodomy are males or females.
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summoned to support the argument that the sexual order
based on the consensual principle leads to relational anarchy.
It must be kept in mind that, in addition to the require-
ments of adulthood and privacy, the consensual principle has
a solid intrinsic constraint: mutual consent. There is no rea-
son to assume that consenting adults would prefer casual sex
over a more permanent and a more meaningful relationship.
Originating from religious neurosis, such assumptions mis-
read human inclinations to form intimate relationships.
An intimate relationship is primarily an association be-
tween two persons, of the opposite sex or the same sex, who
have some kind of sexual intimacy.'55 Ordinarily, an inti-
mate relationship is distinguishable from a casual sexual af-
fair. In a casual affair, sexual partners seek each other pri-
marily for sexual gratification. Such relationships are often
brief and one-dimensional, in that the partners' interest in
each other is defined by and often limited to sexual activity.
The intimate relationship, on the other hand, is much more
complex. Of course, sex is an essential part of an intimate
relationship, 56 but partners in an intimate relationship de-
velop a more profound bonding. This bonding normally
involves mutual commitment and is founded upon bilateral
care, compassion, and even sexual fidelity. Furthermore, an
intimate relationship may establish intellectual, artistic or
aesthetic unions between the partners. Each intimate relation-
ship has a unique character, depending upon the mutual ex-
pectations of the partners. On a more practical level, inti-
mate partners often prefer to live together, and tend to
share their income, property, and other resources. One clari-
fication is in order. The consensual principle does not reject
the concept of the singular relationship. An intimate relation-
ship may meet the test of the singular relationship. Yet the
distinction is clear: the consensual principle does not impose
the singular relationship on individuals; the traditional Au-
gustinian sexual order does.
Numerous arguments derived from psychological, socio-
logical, philosophical and legal sources have been advanced
to support and justify the consensual principle.'57 These ar-
155. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 89 (1980).
156. Thus an intimate relationship is distinguishable from nonsexual friendship.
157. See generally Karst, supra note 155. See Grey, Eros, Civilization, and the
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guments attempt to free consensual sex from instinctual sup-
pression, archaic morality and state intervention. Consensual
sex introduces a new paradigm that reflects contemporary
social freedoms and new individual attitudes toward sexuality.
It challenges the exclusivity of vaginal sex, heterosexuality,
marital vows of fidelity and the concept of the singular rela-
tionship, turning the traditional sex code upside down. It rec-
ognizes that many men and women now cherish a sexual
freedom that offers a range of sexual partners, sexual practic-
es and sexual objectives. It acknowledges without moral du-
plicity that homosexuality is real and widely practiced. It
accepts sexuality as it is; it refuses to enshrine a moral con-
sciousness to which many no longer adhere.
2. The Right of Privacy
The new paradigm of consensual sex has not only weak-
ened roots of the Augustinian sexual order, it has introduced
significant confusion in constitutional jurisprudence. In a cul-
ture where individual rights and freedoms attain approval
and respectability, the power of the consensual principle is
irresistible. Consequently, to defend individual liberty con-
stitutional jurisprudence has begun to challenge religious
neurosis and accommodate some aspects of the consensual
principle. As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court
does not use the consensual principle in its legal analysis;
instead it has utilized the concept of privacy to grant free-
doms which have historically been denied under the dictates
of the traditional sexual order.' 8  Some state supreme
Burger Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1980) (listing in the appendix, 43 law
review articles and student notes published between 1965 and 1979 which sup-
ported the protection of consensual sex under the constitutional concept of priva-
cy). For an elegant and comprehensive philosophical and moral justification of
consensual sex, see H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1966). Cf Posner,
The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1431 (1986) (arguing that not every consensual transaction between informed
adults having no effects on third parties should receive our moral approbation. Id.
at 1442).
158. See cases cited supra note 145. But see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va. 1975), afJ'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (Supreme Court
affirmed without oral argument or opinion a lower court ruling upholding the
application of criminal penalties to private consensual sex). In Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), the Supreme Court refused to include consensual homo-
sexuality in the fold of right of privacy.
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courts, however, have ruled that the right of privacy includes
the right to select consensual adult sex partners. 59 Al-
though the right of privacy recognized in the constitutional
jurisprudence has also been invoked to protect non-sexual
matters,16 recent privacy cases examine principal norms of
the traditional sexual order.
Among privacy cases, the ones dealing with contracep-
tives seem to have most deeply shaken the foundation of
religious neurosis. In Griswold v. Connecticut,16' the Court
invoked the right of privacy to invalidate a statute under
which it was unlawful for married couples to use contracep-
tives. To allow the government to search bedrooms for signs
of the use of contraceptives, the Court ruled, is repulsive to
the principle of privacy.'62 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 161 the
Court extended the right of privacy to unmarried sexual
partners and ruled that a ban on distribution of contracep-
tives to unmarried sexual partners is equally impermissi-
ble.16 1 In a subsequent case, the Court took yet another
step and prohibited the states from limiting the distribution
of contraceptives to licensed pharmacists. 65 Consequently,
the Court has made it constitutional for any individual to use
contraceptives without a prescription.
State statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptives were
consistent with the procreation principle embodied in the
Augustinian sexual order. These statutes were enacted not to
ban the distribution of contraceptives for the prevention of
disease; contraceptives for preventing the spread of disease
were already available.' 66 The purpose of these statutes was
to punish individuals who engaged in sex using contracep-
tives to avoid procreation. This purpose, the Court ruled, is
159. Post v. State 715 P.2d 1105, reh'g denied, 711 P.2d 1151, cert. denied sub
nom. Oklahoma v. Post. 479 U.S. 890 (1986).
160. For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the concept of
privacy was invoked to recognize parents' right to teach German to their children.
161. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
162. Id. at 485-486.
163. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). But see R. BORK, supra note 136, at 111. Bork
criticizes the Court's expansion of the right of privacy, arguing that constitutionally
protected availability of contraceptives to unmarried people undermined the
appreciation of marriage. Id.
164. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
165. Carey v. Populations Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
166. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 442 (1972).
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incompatible with the protected right of privacy which allows
individuals the decisional freedom of whether to bear or
beget a child.'67 By invalidating anti-contraceptive statutes,
the Court has not only undermined the procreation principle
but legitimized recreational sex as well. Individuals have
gained a new freedom: to engage in sex for pleasure without
governmental intrusion. As a result, the state has lost its
moral authority to impose the traditional procreation princi-
ple.
The state's moral authority to enforce the procreation
principle was further weakened when the Supreme Court ex-
tended the right of privacy to allow abortion. 6  The
Court's reasoning in upholding a woman's decision to termi-
nate her pregnancy is both complex and controversial, and
has been widely commented upon. 69 For the purpose of
this article, however, two limited points may be made. First,
the right of privacy allowing abortion subverts in a funda-
mental way the traditional procreation principle. The contrast
is vivid. Under the traditional code, lawful sexual partners
may engage in sex for procreation only; but under the ex-
tended right of privacy that allows contraceptives and abor-
tion, they may repel procreation completely. Second, lawful
availability of abortion stretches recreational sex to its logical
limits. Sexual partners in general, and women in particular,
may now lawfully seek sex for pleasure to the extent that
partners, by mutual consent, or even women acting alone can
terminate an unwanted pregnancy caused by recreational sex.
Since the procreation principle has begun to disintegrate
under the pressure of constitutional privacy, the traditional
167. Under the Augustinian sexual order, procreation is the only legitimate
sexual objective: sex for pleasure is prohibited. See supra text accompanying notes
88-90. See also Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 781 n.19 (1988) (explaining Thomas Aquinas' theory of
procreational sex). The constitutional jurisprudence recognizes procreation as a
fundamental right. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). But it does not
allow states to make procreation the exclusive objective of sexual activity, because
individuals have a constitutional right to use contraceptives and, thus, prevent
proceation. See cases cited supra note 145. This is how constitutional jurisprudence
begins to drift away from Augustinian hermeneutics.
168. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
169. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Ciying Wof." A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE LJ. 920 (1973); Coleman, Roe v. Wade: A Retrospective Look at a Judicial
Oxymoron, 29 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 7 (1984); Heymann and Barzelay, The Forest and the
Trees, Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973).
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prohibition against acts of sodomy no longer makes much
logical or hermeneutic sense. As discussed earlier, the tradi-
tional moral code allows only one sexual practice: genital sex.
Sexual practices such as anal and oral sex are prohibited
because they are inconsistent with the procreation principle,
but the right of privacy has largely subsumed the procreation
principle. If sexual partners may obtain contraceptives and
engage in nonprocreative sex, if unmarried couples may seek
abortion to terminate unwanted pregnancies, and if these ac-
tivities are protected by the right of privacy, then prohibi-
tions against other nonprocreative sexual practices which are,
if anything, less threatening to the principle of procreation,
may as well be annulled. Although the Supreme Court has
not yet decided the question whether the right of privacy
prevents states from punishing sexual partners of the oppo-
site sex for engaging in acts of sodomy, there are reasons to
believe that such sexual practices are protected behind the
veil of privacy. Justice Stevens has indicated that under the
constitutional jurisprudence of the right of privacy, it might
be unconstitutional for a state to prohibit sexual partners of
the opposite sex to engage in sodomy within the precincts of
their bedrooms. 70
The right of privacy seems to have substantially undone
enforcement of the procreation principle. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has refused to extend the right of privacy to
protect nonprocreative sexual practices between persons of
the same sex.' 71 Thus the concept of privacy recognized in
constitutional jurisprudence lacks the philosophical coherence
of the consensual principle. Several commentators have ar-
gued that the analytical sleight of hand with which the High
Court tolerates heterosexual sodomy but condemns homosex-
ual sodomy is duplicitous and arbitrary. 172 The equal pro-
tection of laws should mandate that the right of privacy be
170. Hardwick v. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 214 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. Hardwick v. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
172. See Khan, supra note 98. Note, Bowers v. Hardwick and the Legitimation of
Homophobia in America, 30 HOWARD L.J. 829 (1987); Note, The Supreme Court
Refused to Expand the Right of Privacy to Include Homosexual Sodomy in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 313, 330 (1987). Note, Histoly, Homosexuals, and
Homophobia: The Judicial Intolerance of Bowers v. Hardwick, 19 CONN. L. REv. 129,
137 (1986). For an excellant critique of Bowers v. Hardwick, see Law, Homosexuali-
ty and the Social Meaning of Gender, Wis. L. REV. 187 (1988).
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extended to homosexuals.' The inconsistent manner in
which the courts have applied the right of privacy suggests
that the Augustinian tradition of religious neurosis still in-
fluences many members of the judiciary.
Still, the limited right of privacy recognized in constitu-
tional jurisprudence seems to have impaired the edifice of
the singular relationship as well. Again, the contraceptive
cases have caused the injury. While Griswold has weakened
the procreation principle, 1 4 Eisenstadt has undermined the
institution of marriage. 5 Eisenstadt accords unmarried cou-
ples a constitutional right to use contraceptives without gov-
ernment intrusion. 7 It might be helpful to examine the
reasoning underlying Eisenstadt. To counter the argument
that availability of contraceptives would encourage nonmarital
sex, the Court observed that pregnancy and the birth of an
unwanted child could not be a defensible punishment for
fornication. 77 Moreover, the Court rejected the argument
that the ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons deters premarital sex.17 1 Such a ban is an uncon-
stitutional infringement of the right of privacy: "If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."171
This right of privacy extended to unmarried persons has
substantially impaired the state's moral authority to enforce
the marital principle, under which marriage is a prerequisite
for sexual intercourse and bearing children. If unmarried
couples have a constitutional right to use contraceptives, it
follows that marriage is no longer a legal prerequisite to
engage in sexual intercourse. Of course, the Constitution
173. See Khan, supra note 98, at 960-63. If the use of contraceptives is legal
for heterosexuals, why it is not for homosexuals? If heterosexual sodomy is pro-
tected under the right of privacy, why isn't homosexual sodomy protected? If sex
for pleasure is allowed to heterosexuals, why it is not to homosexuals? Discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual preference may violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
174. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
175. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
176. Id. at 439.
177. Id. at 448.
178. Id. at 449.
179. Id. at 453 (emphasis original).
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recognizes and protects the right to marry. Nonetheless, a
mere recognition of the right to marriage does not satisfy
the traditional marital principle, which would forbid all sexu-
al activity outside of marriage. But Eisenstadt seems to sug-
gest that the constitutional jurisprudence protects nonmarital
sex. In light of Eisenstadt it may be argued that while states
may arguably enforce the marital principle, they are under
no constitutional obligation to do so. For example, a state
will commit no constitutional wrong if it repeals the fornica-
tion statute, as several states have.' Similarly, a state may
refuse to enforce or even repeal the adultery statute. In oth-
er words, a plain reading of Eisenstadt would suggest that the
Constitution allows but does not mandate that states enforce
the marital principle. Eisenstadt seems an important rejection
of religious neurosis under which any sex outside of mar-
riage is forbidden.
But the Court's analysis in Eisenstadt is murky and its
rejection of religious neurosis evasive. While it protects the
privacy right of unmarried couples to use contraceptives, it
also asserts that state fornication and adultery statutes are
constitutional, which means that the state has the moral au-
thority to prevent and punish any and all sex outside of mar-
riage.' This inconsistency is the defining attribute of a
constitutional jurisprudence torn between religious neurosis
and the consensual principle. If unmarried persons have a
protected right to decide whether to bear or beget a child
and if governmental intrusion into this matter is unconstitu-
tional, state fornication statutes are incompatible with the
right of privacy. But if a state may lawfully punish unmarried
persons for fornication, it is not clear how they can exercise
their constitutional right to decide whether to bear or beget
a child. Conversely, how can taking advantage of a recog-
nized right be a criminal act? To uphold that individuals
have a constitutionally protected privacy right to decide
whether to beget a child, but to simultaneously insist that the
state can punish these individuals for fornication, places a
constitutional right directly within the precinct of a criminal
act. If the Eisenstadt ruling is meaningful, the constitutionality
of fornication statutes rests on a fractured foundation and
180. See Schneider, supra note 109, at 1818.
181. Eisenstad 405 U.S. at 449.
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would not be upheld if challenged. On the other hand, if in
the presence of the right of privacy the fornication statutes
are still valid, the constitutional jurisprudence of privacy is
both confusing and incoherent.
It might be instructive to summarize the constitutional
jurisprudence protecting privacy rights. Sexual partners of
the opposite sex have a fundamental right to use contracep-
tives. ' 2 Thus the traditional procreation principle is incom-
patible with the constitutional jurisprudence in that sexual
partners have a right to enjoy sex and repel procreation.
Moreover, even if recreational sex results in an unwanted
pregnancy, the woman has a constitutional right to abort the
fetus.18 There are reasons to believe that heterosexual sod-
omy is also protected under the right of privacy.' Further-
more, constitutional jurisprudence does not require that to
enjoy these privacy rights heterosexual partners be mar-
ried. ' 5 Thus as far as heterosexual partners are concerned,
the traditional sexual order must yield to the right of privacy
exercised. In this historic dismantling of religious neurosis
and the attendant sexual order, however, constitutional juris-
prudence has carved out an apparently indefensible excep-
tion, insisting that the right of privacy does not protect ho-
mosexual love.8 6 Finally, it has failed to clearly articulate a
constitutional right to non-marital intimacy.
B. Despiritualization of Women
At the risk of oversimplification, this section attempts to
provide an insight into the relationship between religious
neurosis and contemporary treatment of women. Again, it is
182. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down state ban on
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (striking down state law forbidding use of contraceptives by married
persons).
183. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (limiting state power
to regulate abortions); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down state ban
on abortions). The recent trend, however, seems to curtail the freedom of abor-
tion. See supra note 140.
184. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
supra text accompanying note 171.
185. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down state ban on
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
186. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (consensual homosexuality is not
protected under the right of privacy).
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not contended that religious neurosis is exclusively respon-
sible for the historical subordination of women. Complex
physical, social and economic forces worked together over
the centuries to create, entrench and defend the subjugation
of women. While religious neurosis might have played some
part in the causation of gender inequality, its historical role
has been to provide a hermeneutic justification for support-
ing the inferior status of women. In the past few decades,
the traditional structure of family and the male-dominated
socio-political order are in the process of deconstruction.
Much has changed, some in the name of the Constitution.
This section first discusses the principle of equal respect. In
order to complete the discussion of religious neurosis, it is
argued that constitutional protection of pornography has
resulted in despiritualization of women. One caveat is called
for. This section does not address the range of reasons for
which pornography is protected. Rather, it provides a few
hermeneutic insights into an otherwise complex jurispru-
dence.
Constitutional jurisprudence has traditionally embraced
the old notions that women are dependent on men, that "in
the struggle for subsistence she is not an equal competitor
with her brother,"187 or that "[t]he paramount destiny and
mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices
of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator." 88
These beliefs were of course consistent with the Augustinian
sexual order and the concomitant religious neurosis that
treat women as a source of sexual temptation who lead men
away from higher pursuits, and whom God has created for
no other purpose than procreation." 9 According to Justice
Brennan, throughout much of the 19th century (and even
before) the position of women in the United States was in
many respects comparable to slaves: women could not vote
or hold office, serve on juries or bring suit in their own
names, and married women could not hold or convey prop-
erty or even serve as legal guardians of their own
187. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).
188. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., con-
curring).
189. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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children.'
To counter the religious neurosis that reduces women to
mere reproductive objects, new arguments are being made
for changing the status of women from one of dependence
to one of independence.' This new consciousness express-
es itself through the principle of equal respect, which em-
phasizes the inherent dignity of women and promotes the
participation of women, on equal terms with men, in all
spheres of life.' 2 The principle of equal respect proposes
to modify existing social and cultural patterns, gender biases
and prejudices based on the idea of the inferiority of women
or on stereotyped roles of men and women.'9 The princi-
ple protects the full development of the potentialities of
women and rejects the notion that women are mere repro-
ductive organisms who ought to be domesticated for the
good of the family. Of course, women carry a substantially
higher burden in procreation, but this natural responsibility
does not justify their exclusion from the political, economic,
social, or cultural life of the nation, nor does it relieve men
of their responsibility in the upbringing and development of
children.9 4 Women are equally entitled to all the rights
and freedoms that men have enjoyed over the centuries.
They are born free and equal in dignity, and therefore they
are entitled to equal respect. 9 5
If the principle of equal respect were fully embraced, it
would replace religious neurosis and reject concomitant atti-
190. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
191. Article 1, paragraph 3 of the 1945 United Nations Charter and Article 2
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights bar discrimination on the basis of
sex. Similarly, the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 2 (1978), as well as the United N ations International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2 (1918), proscribe gender discrimination.
Furthermore, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women [hereinafter Convention] has been specifically
designed to sensitize the international community of states to the historical and
cultural patterns that discriminate and denigrate women. United Nations Con-
ference of the United Nations Decade for Women, Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1980). This international norma-
tive activity shows the emergence of a new consciousness rooted in the principle
of equal respect for all human beings, without any gender discrimination.
192. Convention, supra note 191, art. 3.
193. Id. art. 5.
194. Id.
195. Id. see preamble.
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tudes that deny women their inherent dignity. If women are
allowed to participate fully in all spheres of life, it would
discredit the Augustinian thesis that the role of women is
confined to procreation. There is a vivid contrast between
religious neurosis and the principle of equal respect. Reli-
gious neurosis conceives women as limited beings whom God
has created primarily for reproduction, whereas the principle
of equal respect postulates the dignity and worth of each
human person and requires the maximum participation of
women on equal terms with men in all fields.196 Religious
neurosis justifies placing women in traditional households;
the principle of equal respect justifies the full development
and advancement of women, recognizing their right to edu-
cation, 197 their right to work in the marketplace,' and
their right to participate in all social and community activi-
ties. 99
On the surface, constitutional jurisprudence has begun
to enforce the principle of equal respect in granting women
civil and political rights. Of course, the position of women in
America has improved markedly in recent decades200 and
only cynics would insist that nothing has changed. Nonethe-
less, a profound bond still appears to exist between religious
neurosis and constitutional jurisprudence. It might be useful
to restate at this point the duality that constitutes the tradi-
tional hermeneutic order which prohibits sex for pleasure,
considers procreation as a regrettable necessity and exalts
sexual continence as a preferred value. The contradiction
between reproductive necessity and higher virtue is founded
upon the cleavage between body and soul, sex and spirit.
Embodied in this cleavage is the further belief that women
represent body and sex, but men epitomize soul and spir-
it.21 1 The traditional sexual order reduces women to repro-
ductive objects whom good men seek not for any spiritual
union but for procreation only.20 2 This objectification of
women has been part of Augustinian sexual order. In the
196. Id. arts. 3, 5, 7.
197. Id. art. 10.
198. Id. art. 11.
199. Id. art. 3, 13, 14.
200. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
201. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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presence of such a tradition, the principle of equal respect
has failed to significantly influence the constitutional jurispru-
dence dealing with the condition of women. Contemporary
constitutional jurisprudence is still rooted in the Augustinian
consciousness, and continues to treat women as sexual ob-
jects. However, the Supreme Court has inverted the tradition-
al sexual order to the extent that it protects, under the first
amendment, speech that presents women not as objects of
procreation but of erotic pleasure and sexual gratification.
First amendment jurisprudence has legitimized a herme-
neutic inversion, in which women are mere objects of porno-
graphic pleasure."' Constitutionally protected pornography
has depicted women as sexual objects who "love to be fucked
by animals, dildoes, fists and penises, especially while being
bound, beaten, cut, mutilated and killed."" 4 In some cities,
ordinances have been proposed to outlaw pornography that
present women as sexual objects who enjoy pain, humiliation,
and rape, and which exhibit women's body parts including
vaginas, breasts and buttocks.2 °5  These ordinances have
been vetoed or held to be unconstitutional. Some commenta-
tors defend the need for sexually explicit expression,06 and
argue that such speech expands the possibilities of aesthetic
203. Karst, Woman's Constitution, DUKE L. J. 447 (1984); A. DWORKIN, PORNOG-
RAPIlY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN AND POR-
NOGRAPHY (L. Lederer ed. 1980); Hommel, Images of Women in Pornography and
Media, 8 N.Y.U.L. & SOC. CHANGE 207 (1978).
204. Baldwin, The Sexuality of Inequality: The Minneapolis Pornography Ordinance,
2 LAW & INEQUALITY 629, 632 (1984). The constitutional jurisprudence draws a
distinction between pornography and obscenity. The state may lawfully regulate
obscene materials if the following criteria are satisfied: a) the average person ap.
plying contemporary community standards find such materials appealing to the
prurient interest; b) such materials depict a defined sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way; and c) such materials taken as a whole lack serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). These tests
are inadequate from a feminist viewpoint, in that they do not consider whether
such pornographic materials denigrate women.
205. Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance amending tit. 7, chs. 139, 141 (1982)
(passed Dec. 30, 1983: vetoed Jan. 5., 1984), reprinted in 34 UCLA L. REv. 1265,
1270 NN.23-25 (1987). This ordinance was proposed to make pornography a per
se violation of women's civil rights. A similar city ordinance was successfully
enacted in Indianapolis but was held to be unconstitutional. See American Book-
sellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F.Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1985), affid mem, 106 S. Ct. 1172, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
206. Hunter & Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforre, et
al, in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 69, 89 (1988)
(amici are feminists opposing the Indianapolis ordinance, see supra note 205).
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and artistic expression regarding sex,2°7 protects the free
marketplace of ideas,208 and allows women to express them-
selves in creative sexuality.20 9 However, arguments made de-
fending pornography under the rubric of freedom of speech
assume that, in the hierarchy of social values, free speech is
superior to the dignity of women. °
The Augustinian sexual order and pornography that
denigrates women share a common bond: both present wom-
en as sexual objects. The traditional, Augustinian sexual or-
der reduces women to wombs that men may impregnate with
fetuses, thus turning women into mere procreative objects.
Pornography, largely protected under first amendment juris-
prudence, portrays women as vehicles for male sexual gratifi-
cation, thus turning women into mere erotic objects. 21' At
one level, first amendment jurisprudence rejects the tradition-
al order of sexual repression and sexual shame, vindicating
207. Dunlap, Sexual Speech and the State: Putting Pornography in its Place, 17
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 359, 367 (1987).
208. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 1930 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Comment, The Indianapolis Pornography Ordinance: Does the Right to Free Speech
Outweigh Pornography's Harm to Women?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 249, 251 (1985) (distin-
guishing forms of sexual expressions that might be protected). Of course, those
who argue for strong first amendment protection of free speech would reject any
constraints on pornography and even obscenity. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 925-26 (2d ed. 1988) (Professor Tribe argues that "it is con-
stitutionally tenuous for the government to outlaw or to make civilly actionable
the incitement of violence against women only when such incitement is caused by
words or pictures that express . . . that women are meant for domination." Id. at
926).
209. G. Steinem, Erotica v. Pornography, in OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY
REBELLIONS 219 (1983) (making a useful distinction between erotica and pornogra-
phy: erotica is as different from pornography "as love is from rape, as dignity is
from humiliation, as partnership from slavery, as pleasure is from pain." Id.).
210. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988). Professor Tribe
has questioned the distinction that the Supreme Court makes between pornogra-
phy and obscenity. He would protect obscene materials under the First Amend-
ment as well.
211. C. MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 148.
In pornography, women desire dispossession and cruelty. Men, per-
mitted to put words (and other things) in women's mouths, create
scenes in which women desperately want to be bound, battered, tor-
tured, humiliated, and killed. Or merely taken and used. This is
erotic to the male point of view. Subjection itself, with
self-determination ecstatically relinquished, is the content of women's
sexual desire and desirability. Women are there to be violated and
possessed, men to violate and possess them, either on screen or by
camera or pen, on behalf of the viewer.
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critics of the traditional Augustinian sexual order.2  But at
another level, the same first amendment jurisprudence pro-
tects inverted manifestations of religious neurosis, which
continue to deny social and sexual equality to women. There
is a profound connection between pornography and the tra-
ditional sexual order, even though they appear to be quite
antithetical to each other. They are inverted images of each
other, rooted in the same perception and founded upon the
same premise: in the realm of creation, women represent
nothing else but body and sex.
Similarly, the constitutional protection of contraceptive
sex reflects and reinforces the old notion, again in an invert-
ed way, that women are mere physical bodies devoid of spiri-
tuality. Free availability of contraceptives may be socially
defensible to avoid unwanted pregnancies.213 The use of
contraceptives may also be justified under the consensual
principle which allows consenting adults to engage in recre-
ational sex. Nonetheless, nonprocreative sex in a pornograph-
ic climate acquires a new meaning: contraceptives are devices
that turn female bodies into sexual merchandise, erotic com-
modities, empty wombs.2 1 4 Pornography presents women as
212. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). "In opposition to the sorrowing Catho-
lic dismissal of sexuality as an unfortunate and spiritually superficial concomitant
of propagation, pornography affords the alternative idea of the independent status
of sexuality as a profound and shattering ecstasy." Id. at 81.
213. MacKinnon believes the availability of contraception is one of the ways a
woman has control over her own body. However, she emphasizes that many wom-
en decide not to take the necessary precautions because of the social connotations
of such behavior.
[W]omen often do not use birth control because of its social mean-
ing, a meaning we did not create. Using contraception means ac-
knowledging and planning the possibility of intercourse, accepting
one's sexual availability and appearing nonspontaneous. It means ap-
pearing available to male incursions. A good user of contraceptions
can be presumed sexually available and, among other consequences,
raped with relative impunity.
C. MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 95.
214. MacKinnon would argue further that abortion is another devise which
frees men to engage in sex without responsibility.
In the context of sexual critique of gender inequality, abortion prom-
ises to women sex with men on the same reproductive terms as men
have sex with women. So long as women do not control access to
our sexuality, abortion facilitates women's heterosexual availability. In
other words, under conditions of gender inequality, sexual liberation
in this sense does not free women; it frees male sexual aggression.
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seductive mannequins; contraceptives promote exploitation of
female bodies without fear or guilt. This combination of por-
nography and sex free from the constraints of possible pro-
creation makes women targets of sexual objectification, rein-
forcing the Augustinian precept that women are mere physi-
cal entities, and that sexual activity with them is without any
redeeming spiritual value. On the superficial level, therefore,
the constitutional jurisprudence of contraceptive sex seems to
reject the hermeneutic principle of procreation; but deep
down both are engaged in the same neurotic enterprise:
despiritualization of women.
The objectification of women is also reflected in consti-
tutional jurisprudence regarding homosexual love. As dis-
cussed before, constitutional jurisprudence seems to distin-
guish homosexual sodomy from heterosexual sodomy. 15 Al-
though homosexuality has no constitutional protection, there
are reasons to believe that heterosexual sodomy is protected
under the right of privacy. According to Justice Stevens, it
might be unconstitutional for a state to prohibit sexual part-
ners of the opposite sex from engaging in sodomy within the
precincts of their bedrooms. 16 This constitutional duality
might be explained in several different ways.2 7 An explana-
tion rooted in hermeneutic inversion would root this duality
in religious neurosis, which identifies women with the flesh
and men with the spirit. Since men are identified with spirit
and not with the body, any constitutional protection of male
homosexuality would disturb the Augustinian religious order,
under which the distinction between body and soul is critical.
There can be no sex between spiritual beings; hence male
homosexuality is a profound violation of the spiritual order.
Compared to male homosexuality, it would appear that both
female homosexuality and heterosexual sodomy pose a lesser
threat to the hermeneutic order. Since under Augustinian
precepts female homosexuality is a union of mere bodies, it
does not offend the spiritual order. Likewise, heterosexual
The availability of abortion removes the one remaining legitimized
reason that women have had for refusing sex besides the headache.
C. MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 99.
215. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
216. Hardwick v. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 220 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, Wis. L. REV. 187
(1988).
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sodomy involves the use of the female body for sexual gratifi-
cation. Of course, acts of sodomy breach the traditional pro-
creation principle. Nonetheless, both female homosexuality
and heterosexual sodomy are less disruptive of religious neu-
rosis since both, in inverted ways, validate the hermeneutic
belief that God created women as sexual objects. This might
explain why male homosexuality is ordinarily more
threatening to religious neurosis than heterosexual sodomy
and even female homosexuality."' This might also illumi-
nate why constitutional jurisprudence tolerates heterosexual
sodomy, but not homosexual sodomy.21 9
V. CONCLUSION
In the past few decades, the constitutional sexual order
has begun to drift away from religious neurosis rooted in the
Augustinian consciousness. The counter-paradigms of consen-
sual sex and the right of privacy are in the process of dis-
mantling the old structure founded on the singular relation-
ship and the procreation principle. Nonetheless, religious
neurosis still is a formidable force. Its conspicuous manifesta-
tions may be seen in constitutional jurisprudence. Justices of
the United States Supreme Court do not hesitate to invoke
the gospels to justify the oudawing of sexual conduct that
might be defensible under contemporary norms.220  Al-
though legal reasoning rooted in religious neurosis is under-
standable in a theocratic culture, it does not fit with a juris-
prudence founded upon separation of church and state. Be-
cause the Augustinian hermeneutics of sexual order continue
218. T. SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS 192 (1973) (Szasz argues that,
historically, homosexuality is forbidden only for men); H. HYDE, THE OTHER
LOVE: AN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY SURVEY OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN BRITAIN
176-82 (1970) (Hyde shows that lesbianism has not been illegal in Britain.); E.
ETTORRE, LESBIANS, WOMEN, AND SOCIETY 70-71 (1980) (Ettorre states that lesbian-
ism has historically been viewed as non-existent and therefore non-threatening.)
219. As Law has said:
Homosexual relationships challenge dichotomous concepts of gender.
These relationships challenge the notion that social traits, such as
dominance and nurturance, are naturally linked to one sex or the
other. Moreover, those involved in homosexual relations implicitly
reject the social institutions of family, economic, and political life that
are premised on gender inequality and differentiation."
Law, supra note 217, at 196.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 114-120.
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to be a source of law and judicial reasoning, constitutional
jurisprudence presents itself as a confused mix of the old
hermeneutics and new sexual freedoms. Constitutional juris-
prudence recognizes the right of unmarried individuals to
use contraceptives, clearly implying a right to engage in
nonprocreative sex, but has not held that state adultery and
fornication statutes are unconstitutional, and refuses to pro-
tect nonprocreative homosexuality. Furthermore, the constitu-
tional protection of pornography that portrays women as
sexual objects reveals an inverted form of traditional religious
precepts stressing the inferior status of women, contrary to
the principle of equal respect. The coherency and viability of
constitutional jurisprudence will remain impaired until these
defects are addressed and remedied.
